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LAW AND FINANCE: THE CASE OF STOCK 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 
ZHONG ZHANG* 
Abstract: Having grown to one of the largest in the world in just over 
two decades, China’s stock market is cited as a counterexample to the sig-
nificance of law for financial market development. A thorough examination 
of the development of China’s stock market, however, finds that law is ac-
tually critical to sustaining growth. On the other hand, the trajectory of de-
velopment in China is growth first followed by law, and the improvement of 
law is caused by market growth. The experience of China suggests that law 
and market growth exhibit a bidirectional rather than unidirectional causal 
relationship, and the course of development is “growth-law-further growth.” 
Nevertheless, this virtuous cycle is not a guarantee and market growth may 
not lead to stronger law in all instances, as evidenced by the fact that, alt-
hough now better protected from market abuse, Chinese investors remain 
vulnerable to serious managerial misconduct at listed state-owned enterpris-
es. Political and ideological constraints are the key obstacle. Politics and 
ideologies seem to be fundamental to stock market development, for they 
not only explain the stagnation of law in China despite market growth, but 
also, together with economic development, determine market growth, or 
lack thereof, in the first place. Furthermore, the strength of law in a country 
might not be predetermined by its legal origin, as law has improved in cer-
tain respects even in China—a country without the tradition of rule of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite various peculiarities and having the reputation of being “worse 
than a casino,” the stock market of mainland China has grown to prominent 
stature since the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 
1990.1 Since 2007, the total market capitalization of these two stock ex-
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ence on Corporate Governance and Corruption, Hanken School of Economics, Helsinki, and par-
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 1 Anthony Kuhn, Chinese Markets ‘Worse Than a Casino,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2001), http://
articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/29/business/fi-44137 [https://perma.cc/X3WW-TWQX]; Richard 
McGregor, Crackdown on Corruption Splits Beijing, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A14. 
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changes has been greater than almost all stock markets, trailing only the 
United States’ New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.2 In addition, av-
erage daily trading value is second only to the U.S. exchanges.3 In terms of 
funds raised via initial public offerings (IPOs), mainland China ranked first 
in 2007, 2010, and 2011, and second in 2008, 2009, and 2012.4 Since 2012, 
China boasts more than 170 million stock trading accounts and tens of mil-
lions of investors.5 
This rapid growth in China’s stock market contradicts the findings of 
well-known law and finance research that concludes that legal protection of 
investors is essential for financial market development. 6 It is commonly 
regarded that Chinese law, in general, and investor protection, in particular, 
                                                                                                                           
 2  See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current $US) (2011–2015), 
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD [https://perma.cc/M43P-
KUHY] (last visited May 19, 2016); Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Cur-
rent US$) (2006–2010), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?
page=1 [https://perma.cc/3Z4F-TUS4] (last visited May 19, 2016). It has been argued that the 
official market capitalization data of the Chinese exchanges was a huge exaggeration because the 
data was calculated based on the prices of shares traded on the stock exchanges, but shares of 
listed companies in China were divided into state, legal person, and public shares (each accounting 
for about a third of the total). Only public shares were tradable on the exchanges, and the prices 
recorded for off-exchange transactions of state or legal person shares were much lower than the 
trading prices of public shares. See CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING 
CHINA: INSIDE CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS 121–24 (2d ed. 2006). For the classification of 
shares of listed companies in China, see STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCK MARKET: A GUIDE TO 
ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 15–18 (2003). In 2005, however, the Chinese govern-
ment launched a reform to convert the non-tradable state and legal shares into tradable shares, and 
by the end of 2009, the restriction on the tradability of state and legal shares was history. See 
WALTER & HOWIE, supra, at 121–24. 
 3 See, e.g., WORLD FED’N OF EXCH., MONTHLY REPORT: EQUITY: VALUE OF SHARE TRAD-
ING (2015) (on file with author). The daily trading value sometimes exceeded the figure of the 
United States during the boom time of the first half of 2015. Laura He, China’s Equity Mania 
Intensifies—Daily Trading Volume Now 4x NYSE, DAVID STOCKMAN’S CONTRA CORNER (Mar. 
27, 2015), http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/chinas-equity-mania-intensifies-daily-trading-
volume-now-4x-nyse/ [https://perma.cc/7ABY-NF5S]. 
 4 See Greater China IPO Watch 2009, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 12 (2009), http://www.
lefigaro.fr/assets/pdf/Etude%20IPO%20Chine.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG2B-2U3M]; Greater Chi-
na IPO Watch 2012, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 20 (2012), http://www.pwchk.com/webmedia/
doc/635025856837447502_gc_ipo_survey_rpt_apr2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU2R-UG2Z]. 
 5 China Securities Registration and Settlement Statistical Yearbook, CHINA SECURITIES DE-
POSITORY AND CLEARING CORP. LTD. 4 (2012), http://www.chinaclear.cn/zdjs/editor_file/2013
0906103133909.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW3G-MB9B]. An investor needs to open an account at 
the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation (CSDCC) to trade shares listed in 
Shanghai or Shenzhen. The actual number of investors is smaller than the total number of trading 
accounts, because an investor needs to open a trading account separately to trade shares in Shang-
hai or Shenzhen. See id. at 9. 
 6 See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J.  FIN. ECON. 430, 
463 (2008); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 474 
(1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1151–52 (1998); Ra-
fael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997). 
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are extraordinarily weak. According to the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors, between 1996 and 2012, China was within the range of 36.36th to 
38.86th percentile rank in rule of law among all of the 215 economies under 
assessment.7 In the World Bank’s “Doing Business” report, China ranked 
93rd in 2010 and 97th in 2011 out of 183 economies in “protecting inves-
tors.” 8  The 2013–14 Global Competitiveness Report ranked China 75th 
among 148 economies in “[p]rotection of minority shareholders’ interests,” 
80th in “[s]trength of auditing and reporting standards,” and 84th in 
“[e]fficacy of corporate boards.”9 It seems that the stock market in China 
has been able to grow rapidly notwithstanding the perceived weak investor-
protection law. Indeed, in examining the links between law, finance, and 
economic growth in China, Franklin Allen concluded that China is “an im-
portant counterexample” to the significance of law.10 
Is China indeed a counterexample? Is it true that investor protection 
has not played a role in China’s stock market development? These are intri-
guing and important questions. The connection among law, financial market 
development, and economic growth has been widely accepted, as evidenced 
by the fact that both the World Bank and the World Economic Forum use 
investor protection as an indicator of the business environment or competi-
tiveness of economies around the world.11 Nevertheless, if the answer to 
those questions is “yes,” the “law matters” thesis would be cast into serious 
doubt, considering that China has been able to rapidly develop its stock 
market into one of the world’s largest. Moreover, as a live case of great 
magnitude, China’s experience could offer valuable insights into other law 
and finance issues, such as whether the positive correlation between inves-
tor protection and financial market development found by the law and fi-
                                                                                                                           
 7Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996–2014), WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (select “Download Full Data Set (Excel)”; open Excel file; and 
choose “Rule of Law” tab) [https://perma.cc/33FF-LY9Q]. 
 8 WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS IN A MORE TRANSPARENT WORLD 88 
(2012), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB12-FullReport [https://perma.cc/QK3N-2DPE] [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 
2012]; WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2011: MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS 156 (2011), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/
Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB11-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V36-F8J3] [herein-
after DOING BUSINESS 2011]. 
 9 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014, at 156–57 
(Klaus Schwab ed., 2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_
2013-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRU5-D9GH]. 
 10 Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China 36 (Wharton Fin. Inst. 
Ctr. Working Paper No. 02-44, 2002). 
 11 See DOING BUSINESS 2012, supra note 8, at 88; DOING BUSINESS 2011, supra note 8, at 
156; WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 9, at 157.  
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nance research12 is due to a causal relationship from investor protection to 
market growth or the opposite;13 whether the strength of investor protection 
in a country is predetermined by the legal origin14 or shaped by the modern 
politics;15 whether formal law for investor protection can be substituted by 
informal institutions;16 and why a market grows in the first place. 
China’s stock market thus deserves more attention and a thorough and 
in-depth analysis. To achieve this end, this Article undertakes a detailed and 
comprehensive investigation into the history of China’s stock market devel-
opment. It takes a qualitative approach to examine on-the-ground develop-
ments and examines the whole history, rather than the state of the market at 
a specific point of time, in order to gain a full and holistic view. The Article 
finds that, rather than being a counterexample, the case of China demon-
strates that investor protection is critical to sustaining market growth and 
informal institutions cannot substitute for formal law. It is true that investor 
protection was hardly relevant to the rapid growth of the market before mid-
2001, but weak law led to ubiquitous frauds (in particular, market manipula-
tion, false information disclosure, and misappropriation of corporate assets) 
towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, bringing the market into se-
vere crisis and even to the verge of complete collapse.17 
To no avail, the government was forced to take various measures to 
prop up the market. It was only after actions were taken to curb fraud and a 
degree of law and order had been established that the stock market recov-
ered in 2006.18 When fraud was systemic, even a government as interven-
tionist and powerful as the Chinese could not stop the market from declin-
ing, and the market could only survive after a degree of law and order was 
established. Moreover, between 2010 and the end of 2014, the market was 
again in a prolonged bear state, resulting in a suspension of IPOs for more 
than one year.19 The cause was the low profitability of listed companies, 
which was in turn partly attributable to widespread managerial corruption, 
waste, overinvestment, and mismanagement at listed state-owned enterpris-
es (SOEs) that still dominate Chinese exchanges.20 Although investors are 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 6, at 1152; La Porta et al., Legal Determi-
nants of External Finance, supra note 6, at 1149. 
 13 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State 
in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 80–81 (2001). 
 14 See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 6, at 1116; La Porta et al., Legal Determi-
nants of External Finance, supra note 6, at 1149–50. 
 15 See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
460, 516–17 (2006). 
 16 See Allen et al., supra note 10, at 2. 
 17 See infra Part I.B. 
 18 See infra Part I.C. 
 19 See infra Parts I.D. and I.E. 
 20 See id. 
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now better protected from market fraud, they are still vulnerable to manage-
rial misbehavior at listed SOEs. It is evident that when investor protection is 
weak and managerial misconduct unchecked, corporate profitability suffers, 
market volatility reigns, and growth capacity shrinks. 
Nonetheless, the experience of China shows that the scope of investor 
protection investigated by the law and finance research and assessed by the 
World Bank and World Economic Forum is too narrow. It focuses on share-
holders’ rights against their companies and managers. But the severe crisis 
China’s stock market encountered in the early 2000s was a result of market 
abuse by miscreant stock traders as well as false disclosure by listed com-
panies and asset appropriation by controlling shareholders.21 Investor pro-
tection in China in these areas has improved noticeably, but this has not 
been captured by those assessments because of their narrow coverage. The 
research that finds China is a counterexample also misses the improvement, 
not just because of its narrow coverage but also because of its static re-
search approach, capturing only a snapshot at a time. 
Second, this Article finds that, although law is critical to sustaining 
growth, the trajectory of development in China is growth first followed by 
law. China’s stock market emerged and experienced waves of “fever” even 
before a basic legal and regulatory framework was in place; although laws 
were quickly adopted in 1993 after the market regulator, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), was set up, they were largely unenforced 
throughout the 1990s, resulting in pervasive fraud and sustained market vola-
tility.22 But by the early 2000s, the number of investors had grown to tens of 
millions.23 They became a powerful political constituency whose complaints 
and discontent the government could no longer ignore; moreover, as the mar-
ket grew to a substantial scale, it became significant to the national economy 
and strategic for economic reform, motivating the government to crack down 
on fraud in order to restore investor confidence and revive the market.24 The 
experience of China demonstrates that the causal relationship between inves-
tor protection and market growth is bidirectional rather than unidirectional. 
The course of development is growth first, followed by the improvement of 
law, which allows the market to grow further. 
The virtuous cycle of “growth-law-further growth,” however, is not a 
guarantee, and market growth may not always lead to better investor protec-
tion, as evidenced by the fact that serious managerial misconduct remains 
rampant among listed SOEs in China. So why has growth led to the reduc-
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra Part I.C. 
 22 See infra Part II.B. 
 23 See Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 451, 462 (2003) [hereinafter Chen, Capital Markets]. 
 24 See id. 
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tion of market abuse but not managerial misconduct? The answer lies first 
in the dominance of state ownership in those listed SOEs. Because of such 
dominance, serious agency problems inherent with state ownership remain, 
and the incentives for managers to steal and shirk remain unchanged.25 On 
the other hand, the reduction of market fraud is currently achieved largely 
through public enforcement of securities laws by the CSRC and the two ex-
changes under its control, but the agency’s remit to oversee the management 
of listed companies is limited and it has no authority to take legal action 
against managerial corruption.26 In the meantime, private enforcement of the 
law is negligible and Chinese courts have proven useless for investor pro-
tection.27 Lastly, when corruption is endemic in the whole country, it is un-
realistic to expect SOE managers to be any more honest. Apparently, the 
dominance of state ownership, the ineffectiveness of the judiciary, and the 
macro legal environment explain why managerial misconduct persists. Ap-
parently, the dominance of state ownership is due to the remaining socialist 
ideology that favors public over private ownership as well as the Com-
munist Party of China (CPC)’s political consideration to maintain its rule, 
which also explains the impotence of the court system.28 This shows that, 
although investor protection may strengthen as a result of market growth, 
this is not always the case, and fundamental politics and ideologies are the 
root obstacle. 
China’s experience thus reveals that the strength of investor protection 
in a country is not predetermined by its legal origin. Law is not static and 
investor protection can improve in response to political demands brought by 
market growth. This is what happened in China, a country without the tradi-
tion of rule of law. It is true that market growth may not always lead to bet-
ter investor protection, but the fundamental obstacles in China are politics 
and ideologies rather than its legal origin. China’s development reveals that 
no country is destined to be hopeless just because of its history. 
Lastly, why did China’s stock market grow in the first place? Its mar-
ket growth was the natural progression and outcome of liberalizing the ul-
tra-leftist ideology, which regarded capitalism as being evil and the stock 
market the icon of capitalism, and the planned economic system, which 
banned private ownership of the means of production.29 Without such liber-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational 
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 919, 931 (2014), http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/
journal/v45/n8/pdf/jibs201443a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8NT-5642]. 
 26 See infra Part IV.A. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: HIS-
TORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 4, 28 (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf [https://perma.cc/87PD-L22Y]. 
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alization, the shareholding system could not emerge and the stock exchang-
es would not be allowed to open and grow. Next, this is also because rapid 
economic growth as a result of liberalization generated huge financing de-
mand and, in the meantime, household disposable income increased rapidly 
as a result of economic growth, providing sufficient finance to meet de-
mand.30 Finally, Chinese people in the 1990s did not have much choice but 
to invest in the stock market or leave their money in banks with low interest 
rates.31 
On the other hand, there are several other reasons that explain the low 
corporate profitability that underscores the bear market and sluggish growth 
between 2010 and 2014. First, despite liberalization, the current socialist 
market economic system still favors state ownership, allowing inefficient 
SOEs to dominate the stock market. It also allows them to monopolize the 
lucrative business sectors like finance and telecommunications, which en-
sures that even private listed companies, albeit more efficient, have low 
profitability due to exclusion from those lucrative industries.32 Such favorit-
ism is again rooted in the socialist ideology that favors public ownership 
and the CPC’s political consideration to maintain its rule.33 Second, corpo-
rate profitability is also undermined by excessive government bureaucracies 
that increase the cost of doing business in China, for which the political sys-
tem with unchecked government powers is responsible to a degree. Third, 
the low profitability of listed companies is further explained by their lack of 
technologies, brand names, managerial expertise, innovation, etc., which is 
not unusual for a developing country like China. 34 Last, from the mid-
2000s, the booming real estate market has provided Chinese people a highly 
profitable alternative investment opportunity, and the emergence of shadow 
banking in the late 2000s offered investors even more options.35 
Part I of this Article examines the growth history of China’s stock mar-
ket. Part II reviews the development of the legal and regulatory frameworks 
and the evolution of investor protection in China. Part III analyzes the role of 
investor protection in different stages of market development. Part IV assess-
es the causal relationship between investor protection and market growth and 
explores why the stock market of China grew in the first place. 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Allen et al., supra note 10, at 4. 
31 See Ding Chen, Developing a Stock Market Without Institutions—The China Puzzle, 13 J. 
CORP. L. STUD. 151, 172–74 (2013) [hereinafter Chen, The China Puzzle]. 
 32 See infra Part IV.B.  
 33 See Nan Lin, Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Fu-
ture, 7 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 63, 63 (2011). 
34 See Scott Cendrowski, China’s Global 500 Companies Are Bigger Than Ever—And Mostly 
State-Owned, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-global-500-government-
owned/ [https://perma.cc/BH8T-HARZ]. 
35 See infra Part IV.B. 
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I. THE GROWTH OF CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 
China’s experience with the stock market dates back more than a cen-
tury. In the mid-1930s, Shanghai was the financial center of the Far East. 
Stock exchanges also operated in Beijing and Tianjin before the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949.36 Although the turbulent 
pre-PRC history is informative, this Article focuses on the stock market that 
has developed since 1978, when the CPC, under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, decided to abandon far-left ideologies and shift the nation’s atten-
tion from political and ideological campaigns to economic development. 
Since then, the whole history of the stock market can be divided into five 
stages: (1) pre-1992, when the shareholder system emerged and the stock 
exchanges were opened; (2) between 1992 and mid-2001, when the market 
experienced rapid growth; (3) between mid-2001 and 2005, when the stock 
market was in crisis; (4) between 2006 and 2009, when the market recov-
ered and experienced an enormous boom and crash; and (5) between 2010 
and 2014, when the market exhibited sharpened contraction. 
A. The Emergence of the Shareholding System and the  
Establishment of the Stock Exchanges 
The first green shoots of the shareholding system emerged in rural are-
as.37 The shareholding system began as an alternative to government finance 
for town and village enterprises, which expanded rapidly after the agriculture 
sector was de-collectivized. It was also used to organize rural cooperatives to 
distribute returns to villagers. It was in urban China, however, that the share-
holding system developed rapidly and the stock market emerged. As far-left 
ideologies and economic planning were relaxed through China’s great awak-
ening, enterprises were allowed to produce beyond their plan quotas to fulfill 
market demand. But government finance was in severe shortage, making the 
shareholding system particularly useful to raise money from other sources 
and fund the expansion of production. 38 There was also the urgent need to 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See William N. Goetzmann et al., China and the World Financial Markets 1870–1939: 
Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization, 60 ECON. HIST. REV. 267, 273 (2007); William 
C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 47 (1995). For the pre-PRC history of the Shanghai Stock Ex-
change, see W.A. THOMAS, WESTERN CAPITALISM IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI 
STOCK EXCHANGE (2001). 
 37 See HONGRU LIU, TUPO—ZHONGGUO ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHAN ZHI LU (突破－中
国资本市场发展之路) [BREAKING THROUGH—THE ROAD OF CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT] 1, 139 (2008). 
 38 ZHANGZHE LI, ZHONGGUO GUSHI FENGYUN DANGAN (中国股市风云档案) [CHI-
NESE STOCK MARKET SITUATION FILES] 1, 10–12 (2011) [hereinafter LI, CHINESE STOCK 
MARKET]. 
2016] Stock Market Development in China 291 
create jobs, especially for those “sent-down youth” who returned to cities 
from the countryside after the Cultural Revolution ended. 39  At this early 
stage, most of the shares that were issued were in fact debts rather than equi-
ties, as they bore the right to returns at a fixed rate as well as the right of re-
demption at request.40 Invariably, shares were issued internally to employees 
or to other connected enterprises, and enterprises issuing shares were mostly 
collective rather than SOEs.41 
From 1984, the focus of China’s economic reform shifted to cities, and 
the central task was to revitalize ailing SOEs. Inspired by the success of the 
“household responsibility system” in rural areas, the government encour-
aged SOEs to establish “responsibility systems.”42 Some local governments 
went further to experiment with the shareholding system. For example, in 
1986, the Shenzhen government initiated a pilot scheme to transform SOEs 
into shareholding companies.43 A breakthrough came in 1987 when, in addi-
tion to legalizing private enterprises, the CPC proposed to separate the 
ownership and management of SOEs and endorsed the shareholding exper-
iment.44 It was claimed that the system was not innately capitalist and that 
transforming SOEs into companies with a majority of state ownership 
would not lead to privatization and capitalism; instead, it could facilitate the 
separation of ownership and control, helping rationalize the management of 
SOEs.45 Subsequently, a flurry of share issuances swept over the country. 
More than 6000 shareholding enterprises were set up across the country by 
the end of 1987, and 3800 were added in 1988.46 Certainly, the rapid accu-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See, e.g., id. at 13–22; Kathrin Hille, China’s ‘Sent-Down’ Youth, FIN. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 
20, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/3d2ba75c-1fdf-11e3-8861-00144feab7de.html [https://
perma.cc/23XT-H4XT]. 
 40 GREEN, supra note 2, at 9. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. at 10; CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, ‘TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS!’: 
CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS IN THE ‘80S AND ‘90S, 21 (2001).  
 43 Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Guoying Qiye Gufenhua Shidian Zanxing Guiding (深圳经济特区
国营企业股份化试点暂行规定) [Provisional Regulations on the Pilot Program for the Trans-
formation of State-Owned Enterprises of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone into Shareholding 
Companies] (promulgated by the Shenzhen Mun. People’s Gov’t, Oct. 1987) [hereinafter Provi-
sional Regulations on the Pilot Program], in JINRONG FALU FAGUI QUANSHU (金融法律全書) 
[A WHOLE COLLECTION OF FINANCIAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS], Vol. 3, 2815–18 (1997). 
 44 Ziyang Zhao, Yanzhe You Zhongguo Tese de Shehuizhuyi Daolu Qianjin: Zai Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Di Shisanci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Shangde Baogao (March Along the Road to 
Socialism with Chinese Characters: Report to the 13th Congress of CPC), RENMIN RIBAO (PEO-
PLE’S DAILY) (Oct. 25, 1987).  
 45 See Ziyang Zhao, Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shisanjie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di 
Sanci Quanti Huiyi Shangde Baogao (Report to the 3rd Plenum of the 13th Central Committee of 
CPC), PEOPLE (Sept. 26, 1988), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65385/4441840.
html [https://perma.cc/64DU-6M72]. 
 46 See WALTER & HOWIE, TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS!, supra note 42, at 6.  
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mulation of household savings as a result of economic growth ensured that 
these share issuances were possible.47 
Once having acquired shares, holders started to trade them. Markets 
for trading shares emerged spontaneously at places like factory gates, street 
corners, and open markets—so-called “kerb trading.”48 From 1986, state-
owned banks in some cities started to provide over-the-counter (OTC) ser-
vice for stock trading, in addition to trading government bonds. The first 
OTC market for trading stocks was opened in Shanghai in September 1986 
by a local branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC).49 As more shares were issued in 1987 and 1988, local governments 
were active in setting up OTC markets. 
During this period, the shareholding system and stock market were in 
their very early infancy, and the miniscule amount of funds raised through 
issuing shares was dwarfed by the amount raised via government and enter-
prise bonds.50 It was only an experiment for SOE reform. The mainstream 
reform measure was the “responsibility system,” which allowed SOEs to 
retain some profits and to have more managerial autonomy.51 Enterprises 
adopting the shareholding system were collective or small SOEs. Among 
them, the norm was to issue shares internally, and the number of enterprises 
issuing shares publicly was fewer than ninety.52 Issuance was poorly re-
ceived. For example, when the Shenzhen Development Bank, the bellweth-
er of China’s stock market development in the 1990s, offered shares to the 
public in 1987, only 50% were subscribed even after the local government 
mobilized CPC cadres and government employees to buy.53 In the following 
year, Vanke, now the largest real estate developer in China, did not fare any 
better. 54 The trading market was lethargic. For instance, the turnover value 
on the OTC market in Shenzhen was only RMB 4 million for all of 1988.55 
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But the situation changed dramatically after a wave of “share fever” 
broke out in Shenzhen in 1990, which was singlehandedly triggered by the 
Shenzhen Development Bank.56 In March 1989, the Bank declared a gener-
ous dividend. Subsequently, its share price rose steadily, only interrupted in 
June by the tragic ending of the Tiananmen Square student protest.57 Ex-
pecting generous dividends again, the share price of the bank started to pick 
up in January 1990, and by March, it had nearly tripled.58 The expectation 
turned out to be true, and subsequently between March and June of 1990, 
the share price saw another jump of almost 600%.59 The other four compa-
nies listed on the OTC market in Shenzhen performed equally well. Seeing 
fortunes gained overnight, more people rushed to the market and money 
from other parts of the country flooded in. The trading value on the OTC 
market increased more than twenty-three fold between January and May 
1990.60 The black market trading schemes also flourished, and people con-
gregated at street corners and in parks to trade shares.61 The whole city was 
in frenzy. 
This speculation fever came to the attention of the central government. 
It warned against the danger of speculation and ordered the restriction of the 
shareholding experiment in the country.62 The Shenzhen government took 
heed and tried to bring the market under control: a 10% limit for daily price 
movements was introduced; a stamp duty and capital gains tax were im-
posed; the limit on daily price increases were further reduced to 5%, 1%, 
and then 0.5%; and CPC and government officials were ordered to sell their 
shares.63 Eventually, the fever cooled and share prices began to drop in No-
vember 1990.64 
Although the 1990 “share fever” in Shenzhen was short-lived, it was a 
milestone in China’s stock market development. It educated the country that 
the purpose of buying shares is not just to receive dividends, but also that 
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big money could be made when share prices increased. For the first time, it 
ignited the enthusiasm of mainland Chinese for stock investment. This en-
thusiasm underscored the resulting rapid growth of the stock market and 
explains why there have been so many individual investors in China.65 
After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Beijing was once more seized 
by political dogma. Conservatives had the upper hand and economic reform 
stalled.66 It was a surprise that the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
were even allowed to open at the end of 1990, when economic liberalization 
stalled and the stock exchange was still regarded as a symbol of capital-
ism.67 One explanation for the opening of these exchanges despite the polit-
ical reality is that, because it was fearful of the social instability that “share 
fever” might cause, the central government decided to channel all trading 
activities to two localities (Shanghai and Shenzhen), thus limiting the scope 
for instability.68 Another is that by opening the stock exchanges, the gov-
ernment intended to signal to the outside world that, despite the political 
retrenchment, it was still committed to economic reform.69 It is also possi-
ble that the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who had officially retired but 
still enjoyed an overriding authority, lent support to government officials in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen who pushed for setting up the stock exchanges.70 
Nevertheless, the Shanghai Stock Exchange was officially opened on 
November 26, 1990 and started to operate on December 19, 1990, while the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange began operation on December 1, 1990, but was 
approved by Beijing only in July 1991.71 By then, the Shenzhen market had 
already cooled and the Exchange was quiet. The Shenzhen Composite Index 
lost more than half its value between April 1991 and September 1991, and 
there were no transactions at all on April 22, 1991.72 The market only re-
bounded briefly when the city government instructed government-affiliated 
institutions to buy shares on the exchange.73 The Shanghai market was ini-
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tially different as a result of infection by the “share fever” from Shenzhen, 
but was tamed in the second half of 1991 after similar restrictive measures 
were imposed. Although the stock exchanges were open, ideology and poli-
tics in Beijing were unsettled and policy regarding the shareholding system 
and stock market was restrictive.74 For all of 1991, only 0.5 billion shares 
were issued through IPOs, raising RMB 0.5 billion.75 The two exchanges 
were tiny with only eight listed companies altogether; they were local rather 
than national markets, with only one listed company from outside the two 
cities, and consisted of local investors.76 
B. Rapid Growth Between 1992 and Mid-2001 
1. Explosion Following Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” in 1992 
At the age of eighty-eight, Deng Xiaoping engaged in his “Southern 
Tour” as a last-ditch effort to push forward China’s economic reform.77 
Pointing out that “development is the hard truth,”78 he tried to remind the 
leadership in Beijing to re-focus on economic development. He commented 
that markets or planning were not the inherent nature of capitalism or so-
cialism,79 and he endeavored to draw a line under the divisive ideological 
debate about whether markets should be allowed in socialist China. During 
this tour, Deng Xiaoping paid a special visit to the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change and appealed for pragmatism towards the stock market.80 Following 
his tour, the CPC held its 14th Congress in October 1992, where the CPC 
declared that building a “socialist market economy” was the goal of eco-
nomic reform, 81 which was later incorporated in the Constitution of the 
country.82 The market-oriented reform had then reached the point of no re-
turn. The CPC meeting reiterated the benefits of the shareholding system 
and stock market for SOE reform and called for expanding the shareholding 
experiment and developing the stock market.83 Thus, the stock market was 
formally legitimized. 
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Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” sparked an explosion of economic 
activities all over the country. GDP grew by 12.8% in 1992 and 13.4% in 
1993.84 In the stock market, another wave of “share fever” quickly broke 
out. On May 21, 1992, when limits on price changes were removed, the 
Shanghai Composite Index more than doubled in one day.85 A round of 
mass share issuance was triggered throughout the country and people 
rushed to buy shares. 86 Trading centers sponsored by local governments 
sprang up across the country, as did black markets. In this state of rage, a 
serious social disturbance happened in Shenzhen on August 10, 1992. IPOs 
were so popular that investors were required to buy an application form to 
subscribe shares. After the Shenzhen government announced approval of 
share issuance on August 9 and 10, people flocked to the city. On August 9, 
more than one million people queued in the streets of Shenzhen to buy an 
application form,87 but in the evening they were told that application forms 
had been sold out for the next day. Suspecting corruption, people went to 
the government in protest, which soon turned violent. The People’s Armed 
Police had to be called in to put down the riot.88 The conservatives in Bei-
jing seized this opportunity to condemn the stock market and push for its 
closure. Investors were alarmed and share prices plummeted. Nevertheless, 
the top leaders in Beijing decided to save the market and expressed support 
for its continuing development.89 The Shanghai government also instructed 
securities companies under its control to buy shares on the exchange to prop 
up the market.90 Share prices thus rebounded sharply. As a result of the riot, 
the government decided in late 1992 to establish the CSRC.91 An annualized 
quota for share issuance was introduced, and local governments were or-
dered to close down black markets in their areas.92 
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But the rebound was short-lived. From January 1993, share prices 
started to drop, ushering in a bear market lasting almost three years.93 The 
bear market ensued due to changes in the macro economy. The wild excess 
let loose by Deng’s campaign soon had its effect. The national credit plan 
was thrown into chaos by mass share issuance and a flood of bank lend-
ing.94 Inflation rose rapidly and the consumer price index (CPI) climbed 
from 3.4% in 1991 to a dangerous 24.1% in 1994.95 Fearing political and 
social unrest, the government was frightened, as high inflation was one of 
the causes for the Tiananmen protest in 1989.96 From late 1992, the State 
Council started to take action, beginning by halting unapproved share and 
bond issuance.97 As inflation rose quickly in 1993, more forceful actions 
were taken. Dissatisfied with the performance of the People’s Bank of Chi-
na (PBOC), China’s central bank, the State Council took the rare action to 
sack the governor. The then Vice Premier, Zhu Rongji, took over the job 
himself to reinstate order and control over credit provisions.98 In the mean-
time, interest rates were raised twice in the year, with the one-year deposit 
rate reaching 10.98%.99 In this austere environment, it was no wonder that 
share prices declined. The Shanghai Index fell from 1,536.82 in early Janu-
ary of 1993 to 323.92 on July 29, 1994.100 It later regained some lost ground 
as a result of various measures taken by the government to prop up the mar-
ket,101 but it fell back to 516.46 by January 22, 1996.102 On top of this, the 
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market was rocked by the notorious “327 government bond futures” scandal 
in early 1995, where the speculation of government securities resulted in the 
fall of the then largest brokerage and an indefinite suspension of govern-
ment bond futures.103 
With share prices on a roller coaster and significant social unrest, the 
stock market was anything but dull during this period. The size of the mar-
ket grew rapidly. Funds raised through IPOs in 1992 were RMB 5 billion.104 
The figure rose to RMB 19.48 billion in 1993, but decreased to RMB 4.96 
billion in 1994 and RMB 2.27 billion in 1995.105 The number of listed com-
panies increased to 323 by the end of 1995.106 In 1993, 5.614 million trad-
ing accounts were opened, up by 67.22% from the previous year, and by the 
end of 1995, the total number reached almost thirteen million.107 The stock 
exchanges became national, opened to companies for listing and investors 
for trading from outside Shanghai and Shenzhen.108 
2. 1996–98: The Second Wave of Growth 
The second wave of growth started in early 1996. By then share prices 
had become very cheap and the average price to earnings (P/E) ratio in 
Shenzhen was just above nine.109 The macro economy had also changed. 
The GDP growth rate slowed, but was still 10.2% in 1995 and 9.7% in 
1996;110 the CPI fell to 17.1% in 1995 and further to 8.3% in 1996.111 As 
inflation eased, the government cut interest rates twice in 1996.112 Moreo-
ver, the government’s attitude towards the stock market had changed. Back 
in 1992 and 1993, the shareholding system was only an experiment for SOE 
reform;113 the stock market was just too small to be significant for economic 
reform. Zhu Rongji, despite his reform credentials and the fact that the 
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Shanghai Stock Exchange opened under his leadership as the mayor, was 
suspicious of the stock market, seeing it as being too speculative and of lit-
tle economic utility.114 By 1996, however, the previous SOE reform policies 
had come to a dead end. The SOE sector as a whole recorded a net loss for 
the first time in the first quarter of 1996.115 As reform cut off funding from 
government budgets, SOEs were desperate for money. On the other hand, 
the stock market seemed to have grown big enough to play a role to quench 
the thirst of SOEs. Hence the government’s attitude became accommoda-
tive.116 Last, in 1996, the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments, which still 
controlled the stock exchanges, were locked in fierce competition to achieve 
the status of the “national financial center” for their city: various financial 
incentives were offered to attract new listings and to lure securities compa-
nies to relocate; regulation was downplayed and fees for stock trading were 
cut to encourage more trading; the two governments even instructed securi-
ties companies under their control to manipulate share prices up in order to 
lure people into the markets and boost share trading; and the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange even used its own funds to buy shares to drive up share prices.117 
With all these benign conditions, share prices rose and the stock index-
es climbed steadily from January 1996.118 Investors rushed in and the num-
ber of trading accounts increased by more than ten million in 1996.119 The 
volume of trading in the year soared almost fivefold.120 By December, the 
Shanghai Composite Index had more than doubled and the Shenzhen Com-
posite Index more than quadrupled.121 As the market rocketed and investors 
were in ecstasy, the central government became concerned. From October, a 
series of warnings, decrees, regulations, and official speeches were issued to 
try to cool down the market,122 but the market forged ahead. Eventually the 
government decided to take drastic actions. On December 13, a 10% cap for 
daily price movement was reinstated.123 On December 16, People’s Daily, a 
newspaper run by the CPC Central Committee, published an editorial, warn-
ing—in an exceptionally harsh tone—against “excessive speculation” and 
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vowing to bring the market under control.124 Investors reacted in panic, and 
for two days share prices plunged almost to the 10% limit.125 The Shanghai 
Composite Index and the Shenzhen Index lost more than 31% and 43%, 
respectively, in two weeks.126 
As share prices plummeted, the government felt that the market had 
overreacted and subsequently placated investors with reassuring words.127 
The government also intervened to stabilize the market on February 20, 
1997, when the market reacted in panic to the news of Deng Xiaoping’s 
death. 128  Moreover, stock analysts and media spun the events of Hong 
Kong’s return to China and the holding of the 15th CPC congress, predict-
ing that the government would let the market rise to create a festive atmos-
phere.129 The market recovered, and by May 1997, the Shanghai index was 
more than 250 points above its high in 1996.130 This prompted the govern-
ment to take new actions to rein in the market: the share issuance quota for 
1997 was raised to RMB 5 billion and further to RMB 30 billion to increase 
supply; the stamp duty rate was raised; SOEs and listed companies were 
“strictly prohibited” from stock trading; banks were ordered to tighten con-
trol to prevent funds being channeled to the stock market; punishments were 
meted out and several prominent bankers lost their jobs;131 and trading cen-
ters sponsored by local governments were closed, leaving the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange the only venues for public share issue and trad-
ing.132 
Just as these measures began to take effect, the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997 swept the region. Although the financial sector of Mainland China 
was not directly affected, its export, inward foreign direct investment (FDI), 
as well as GDP growth decelerated considerably.133 In this adverse econom-
ic environment, the stock market became quiet and share prices moved in a 
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narrow range.134 Interest rates were cut on four occasions and the stamp 
duty rate was also cut, but the market remained sluggish until May 1999.135 
After this wave of growth, the stock market had reached a new size. 
The number of listed companies increased by more than 500 to 851 by the 
end of 1998 and the market capitalization increased more than fivefold be-
tween 1995 and 1998 to nearly RMB 2 trillion.136 The amount of funds 
raised through IPOs was RMB 65.5 billion in 1997, three times the highest 
figure achieved in 1993.137 The average daily trading value was RMB 12.67 
billion in 1997, almost a quadrupling of the previous high.138 The number of 
trading accounts reached 42.6 million by the end of 1998.139 
3. 1999–2001: The Third Wave of Growth 
The third wave of growth started in May 1999. Within forty days, the 
Shanghai Composite Index jumped more than 65%.140 After some adjust-
ment in the second half of 1999, the market regained its momentum and the 
upward trend lasted until June 14, 2001, when the Shanghai Composite In-
dex reached a new record of 2245.141 Chinese investors fondly remember 
this boom as the “519 Incident.”142 Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Index 
more than doubled during this period. The number of listed companies in-
creased to 1160 and the number of trading accounts to nearly seventy mil-
lion by the end of 2001; market capitalization was over RMB 4.8 trillion by 
the end of 2000, an increase of approximately 150% from the end of 1998; 
and IPO funds reached a historical high of RMB 81.237 billion in 2000.143 
Underpinning this boom were again changes in the macro economy. 
By 1999, the Asian Financial Crisis had subsided and the economy of those 
affected countries stabilized, as did the Chinese economy.144 Exports of the 
country picked up in 1999 and surged in 2000 and inward FDI also acceler-
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ated.145 Moreover, responding to the switch from inflation to deflation, in-
terest rates were cut seven times between 1996 and 1999 146 and the bank 
reserve ratio was also cut twice from 13% in 1998 to 6% in 1999.147 
Another reason for the intense growth exhibited in the stock markets 
was the government’s favorable policies. During this period, the SOE re-
form strategy fundamentally changed and the stock market was no longer 
seen only as a source of funding, but also as a solution to the governance 
problems of SOEs. As the performance and condition of SOEs continued to 
deteriorate, the CPC proposed “to grasp the big and let go the small” in 
1995, which was confirmed by the 15th Congress of the CPC in 1997.148 
But, although “letting go the small” could be achieved simply by selling-off 
small SOEs, there was a question about how “the big” could be 
“grasped.”149 The CPC decided that the shareholding system was the an-
swer. It reiterated the neutrality of the shareholding system and its benefits for 
SOEs. 150 Large and medium SOEs were decreed to diversify their ownership, 
increase equity finance, and undertake standardized corporatization.151 Cor-
poratization and share listing were thus established as the primary means 
for the reform of large and medium SOEs, making the stock market vital. 
The public promise made by the newly promoted Premier Zhu Rongji in 
1998 to “relieve SOEs from their difficulties within three years” added ur-
gency to the reform.152 
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Against this backdrop of change, People’s Daily published another edi-
torial on June 15, 1999, commenting on the recent surge of share prices as 
“recovering” and “normal,” which was in stark contrast in tone to the edito-
rial published in December 1996.153 It claimed that a solid foundation had 
been laid for the market to have a “long-term and stable development,” and 
indicated that a series of supportive measures would be introduced.154 In the 
following days, a number of supportive measures were enacted: the ban on 
SOEs and listed companies for share trading was lifted; securities compa-
nies were allowed to borrow money from banks as well as to access the in-
terbank money market for liquidity; and the quota for insurance companies 
to buy shares on the stock exchanges was raised.155 
Lastly, the effect of fraud needs to be mentioned. Inspired by the “dot-
com bubble” in the United States in 2000 and 2001, fraudsters in China fab-
ricated various hi-tech stories and audaciously engaged in market manipula-
tion. Outrageous scams of all sorts were widespread. The following is just 
one example. 156  A businessman from Hong Kong acquired state-owned, 
non-tradable shares, and therefore control, of a listed SOE in Shenzhen.157 
In the meantime, he secretly set up four companies with concealed identities 
and bought 85% of the total tradable shares of that SOE on the exchange.158 
After control changed hands, the company was re-named “Yi’an Keji” (Keji 
meaning “technology and science” in Chinese) and a succession of an-
nouncements were made to start various hi-tech businesses, such as electric 
cars, new energy, digital communication, nanotechnology, etc.159 “It is al-
most as if [Yi’an] management had picked up the latest hi-tech weekly and 
listed out likely products.”160 The share price rose from RMB 6.39 to RMB 
126.31 and the company had the “honor” to be the first listed company in 
China whose share price surpassed RMB 100.161 Before long, all this turned 
out to be a scam and the share price crashed, but the fraudster had already 
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made handsome profits and fled.162 As cases like this were common, the 
market boom was pretty much a bubble driven by fraud. 
C. 2001–05: The Stock Market in Crisis 
After reaching an historic high on June 14, 2001, Shanghai and Shen-
zhen markets closed the day at a loss, marking the start of a bear market 
lasting for four and half years.163 Share indices lost more than half their val-
ue during this period, and on June 6, 2005, the Shanghai Composite Index 
breached the symbolic low point of 1000.164 As stock prices slumped, inves-
tors withdrew from the market in droves. For example, for all the trading 
accounts in 2005 on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, only 33% held 
stocks.165 The market shrank considerably. Between 2000 and 2005, market 
capitalization decreased from more than RMB 4.8 trillion to less than RMB 
3.25 trillion and the ratio of market capitalization to GDP from 48% to 
18%.166 Funds raised through IPOs declined from RMB 81.24 billion in 
2000 to RMB 5.67 billion in 2005, and IPOs were suspended three times 
during this period.167 Securities companies as a whole were in the red for 
four years from 2002 to 2005.168 The loss in 2002 was nearly RMB 40 bil-
lion, while net assets of the whole sector were only RMB 76.5 billion by the 
end of 2000.169 Throughout this period, the market was gripped by bitter 
debates triggered by a prominent economist’s public denouncement of the 
stock market as being “worse than a casino.”170 The government was urged 
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to “close down the market and start a new one from scratch.”171 The market 
slid to the brink of complete collapse. 
This stock market crisis occurred when the Chinese economy was at its 
best. Between 2001 and 2005, GDP growth accelerated from 8.3% to 
9.9%.172 Exports skyrocketed after China acceded to the World Trade Or-
ganization in 2001, as did inward FDI. 173  On the other hand, inflation 
stayed at a low level with the CPI being around 2%,174 and interest rates 
were consequently kept low throughout the period. It is puzzling why the 
stock market drifted into crisis when the macro economy was in such a 
good shape. Many investors and commentators blamed the government’s 
decision in June 2001 to sell down state shares on the exchanges.175 Inves-
tors feared the market would be overwhelmed by too much supply. In sup-
port of this claim, commentators pointed to the share price drop after the 
government announced its decision and the share price jump after the gov-
ernment suspended and finally abolished the policy.176 But there was the view 
that, with an average price to earnings ratio of 58.22 in Shanghai and 56.04 in 
Shenzhen in 2000, the market was in a huge bubble and market correction 
was inevitable.177 Moreover, the market was repeatedly shaken by scandals, 
including manipulation, like the case of Yi’an Keji, and market cornering, 
falsifying financial information, and misappropriation of listed companies’ 
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funds by their controlling shareholders, and misappropriation of investors’ 
funds and stocks by securities companies.178 Furthermore, despite the robust 
macro economy, the number of listed companies suffering losses increased 
significantly. In 2001, 150 companies, 12.9% of the total, made a loss.179 
Among them, twenty had experienced losses continuously for three years 
and could be delisted according to the CSRC’s new regulations. 180  The 
number of loss-making companies increased to 253 in 2005, constituting 
18.57% of the total.181 
Whatever the cause, the government decided to save the market rather 
than close it down. Responding to heavy criticism and a sharp fall in share 
prices, the government caved and abandoned the plan to sell state shares on 
the exchanges.182 This, however, only produced a short-lived rally, and the 
downward trend continued. The traditional supportive measures, such as 
cutting the stamp duty rate, suspending IPOs, and delivering positive talks 
by government officials, were tried. Even the ban on government officials 
and Party cadres trading shares was lifted. 183 But this time none of the 
measures worked and share prices kept falling.184 Even the CPC’s declara-
tion in 2003 that the shareholding system should be the primary organiza-
tional form for SOEs and that the stock market should be greatly developed 
did not stop the fall.185 
As the crisis intensified, the government realized that more needed to 
be done. The government cracked down on market manipulation and some 
notorious fraudsters were sent to prison; it introduced third-party custody of 
investors’ funds to ensure that securities companies would no longer be able 
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to misappropriate their clients’ money; it undertook a campaign to force 
misappropriated funds of listed companies to be returned; it adopted special 
regulations to afford minority shareholders more say in important decisions 
of their companies; it revised the Company Law and Securities Law to offer 
minority shareholders more protection; it amended the Criminal Law to 
punish information falsification and misappropriation of corporate assets; it 
replaced the quota system for listing with a system of sponsoring under-
writers to ensure that only companies with good performance could be 
listed; it allowed the National Social Security Fund, insurance companies, 
and enterprise pension funds to invest in stocks which fostered institutional 
investment; it introduced Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors and en-
couraged the development of mutual funds; it allowed the shares of state 
and legal persons to be tradable on the exchanges; and it set up a new board 
at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in May 2005 to allow small and medium-
sized enterprises to access the stock market.186 All these efforts finally paid 
off and the market eventually recovered in 2006 and experienced an enor-
mous boom in 2007. 
D. 2006–09: Boom, Bust, and Rebound 
Share prices started to rise at the beginning of 2006. In the second half 
of the year, the market picked up momentum and rose sharply.187 On De-
cember 14, the Shanghai Composite Index surpassed the previous high in 
2001 and for the whole year recorded an increase of more than 130%.188 
The market entered 2007 with a choppy start but then continued its upsurge. 
As share prices shot up and investors rushed in, the government became 
increasingly concerned that a bubble was being formed and warnings were 
given. 189 The economy had also become overheated, and between April 
2006 and the end of 2007, interest rates were raised on eight occasions, and 
the bank reserve ratio was also raised.190 On May 30, 2007, stock indices 
recorded a huge loss when the stamp duty rate was raised.191 But the market 
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shook this off and surged ahead, peaking eventually on October 16, 2007, 
when the Shanghai Composite Index reached 6124, nearly six times the lev-
el when the bull market started at the beginning of 2006.192 Share prices 
then started to drop and, as the global financial crisis intensified, embarked 
on a free fall. By October 28, 2008, the Shanghai Composite Index sank 
almost 75% to 1,664.93.193 The government took a series of actions to prop 
up the market: the stamp duty was cut twice; IPOs were again suspended; 
and state-affiliated, controlling shareholders as well as listed companies 
were ordered to buy shares on the market.194 
During this round of intense growth, the market became one of the 
largest in the world. Funds raised through IPOs soared to RMB 459 billion 
in 2007, by far the highest in the world and more than five times of the pre-
vious record in 2000.195 The government was able to list the major SOEs, 
the “national champions,” including the giant state-owned commercial 
banks.196 Market capitalization increased to RMB 32.7 trillion by the end of 
2007, 123% of GDP and more than six times higher than the previous rec-
ord set in 2000, while average daily trading value was more than RMB 190 
billion, nearly four times higher than the previous record in 2000.197 The 
number of trading accounts reached 143 million by the end of 2007.198 
The global financial crisis hit China hard. Exports decreased by 27.2% 
year-on-year for the first two months of 2009. 199  Inward FDI dropped 
32.7% in January 2009.200 GDP decelerated from 11.9% in 2007 to 6.1% in 
the first quarter of 2009.201 Thousands of factories were closed and tens of 
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millions of migrant workers lost their jobs.202 Facing a looming economic 
crisis, Chinese leadership made a dramatic change in economic policy. In 
November 2008, the State Council announced that the government would 
spend RMB 4 trillion to stimulate the economy.203 The restrictive monetary 
policy was swiftly reversed. Interest rates and the bank reserve ratio were 
cut four times in the last four months of 2008;204 bank-lending quotas were 
“scrapped,”205 and new loans almost doubled in 2009 to RMB 9.59 trillion, 
more than twice the RMB 4 trillion stimulation spending.206 
The stock market responded fiercely. The Shanghai Composite Index 
rose from the trough of around 1700 in 2008 to over 3470 on August 4, 
2009.207 As the market regained buoyancy in 2009, IPOs resumed and a 
large number of companies conducted IPOs on the ChiNext, the new listing 
board opened in Shenzhen in early 2009 for growth companies.208 The re-
maining major SOEs were also listed.209 Funds raised on the stock market 
via IPOs in 2010 even surpassed the boom year of 2007.210 
E. 2010–14: A Prolonged Bear Market 
But the rebound was again short lived. The market lost steam after Au-
gust 2009 and jittered in 2010, with the Shanghai Index overall losing 
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16.04%.211 Concerned about the deluge of bank lending, the government 
raised the bank reserve ratio in early 2010. As the inflation rate rose in late 
2010, the bank reserve ratio was raised further, as were interest rates.212 In 
the meantime, the effect of stimulation quickly tapered off and the GDP 
growth rate fell from 10.4% in 2010 to 9.3% in 2011 and 7.8% in 2012.213 
Profitability of listed companies also decreased and the average return on 
equity (ROE) dropped sharply.214 Moreover, the enormous amount of mon-
ey raised from the market via IPOs was widely believed to have had a dele-
terious effect.215 For all these reasons, the downward trend that started in 
2010 continued, and by July 2013, the Shanghai Index fell below 2000.216 
As economic growth decelerated, the government loosened its monetary 
policy somewhat at the end of 2011 and early 2012, and in May 2012, quiet-
ly instigated a “stimulus 2.0,”217 but the impact on economic growth was 
negligible, like it was on the stock market. 
As share prices decreased, the stock market seemed to drift into anoth-
er crisis. The average daily trading value dropped from more than RMB 225 
billion in 2010 to less than RMB 80 billion in November 2012.218 Of all the 
trading accounts, less than 40% held stocks at the end of 2012.219 IPOs were 
suspended for more than a year from November 2012 to January 2014.220 
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Criticism and debate about the future of the market raged again. The re-
form-minded CSRC chairman, Guo Shuqing, was removed in March 2013 
after a stint of only eighteen months.221 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
AND THE EVOLUTION OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 
The development of the legal and regulatory framework governing the 
stock market in China and the evolution of investor protection can be broad-
ly divided into three stages: (1) the period before 1992, when laws and 
regulations were few and rudimentary; (2) between 1992 and 2000, when a 
legal framework was created and a centralized and unified regulatory sys-
tem was finally established; and (3) starting in 2001, when the government, 
driven by scandals and crises, began to focus on investor protection and 
tighten up law enforcement. 
A. The First Stage Before 1992 
There were no laws governing company formation and operation when 
the shareholding system initially emerged in China. The first such type of 
legislation did not come until 1984, when the Shanghai government ratified 
a document drafted by the PBOC Shanghai Branch.222 It was of great brevi-
ty, comprised of only eight articles.223 At the national level, the first legisla-
tion was a 1985 document issued by the State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce permitting company registration and stipulating some basic 
requirements for it.224 Throughout this period, the central government was 
hands-off. The national legislature—the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
and its Standing Committee—and the State Council did not adopt any com-
pany or securities legislation. There were no laws that clarified which Min-
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istry had regulatory authority over the stock market. Only in 1986, by a 
regulation on the banking sector, did the PBOC incidentally acquire the 
mandate to license non-bank financial institutions and regulate stock and 
bond markets. 225 But the PBOC in Beijing promulgated only one major 
piece of relevant legislation during this period.226 The PBOC was also a 
decentralized system before 1998 in that local branches were effectively 
controlled by local governments rather than by the PBOC in Beijing.227 
Hence, at the national level, laws and regulations on companies and stock 
markets virtually did not exist during this period. 
From the very beginning, local governments were the experimenters 
and promoters of the shareholding system. They became more enthusiastic 
after the mid-1980s, when leftist ideologies were further loosened. To guide 
experiments, some local governments adopted some company and securities 
rules. For example, between 1985 and 1990, the provincial governments of 
Shaanxi, Guangdong, Fujian, and Heilongjiang and the municipal govern-
ments of Beijing, Xiamen, Guangzhou, and others promulgated regulations 
on share issue and transfer.228 In Shenzhen, the government passed a regula-
tion in 1986 to guide the transforming SOEs into shareholding compa-
nies.229 This was the first company legislation in the country specifically for 
the corporatization reform of SOEs.230 In Shanghai, the short document is-
sued in 1984 was superseded by a longer one in 1987, but it still had only 
                                                                                                                           
 225 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yinhang Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (中华人民共和国银行管
理暂行条例)[Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of 
Banks], (promulgated by the State Council,  Jan. 7, 1986), arts. 5, 22, 25 (Lawinfochina). 
 226 Zhengquan Gongsi Guanli Zanxing Banfa (中国人民银行关于印发《证券公司管理暂
行办法》的通知)[Interim Measures on the Administration of Securities Companies] (promulgat-
ed by People’s Bank of China, Oct. 12, 1990) (Lawinfochina). 
 227  See CHARLES WOLF JR. ET AL., FAULT LINES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TERRAIN 121 
(2003). Originally, local governments controlled personnel administration and were responsible 
for funding local PBOC branches. Following a decision made by the CPC and State Council in 
1998, provincial PBOC branches were abolished, and nine cross-province regional branches were 
set up to cut off the control of local governments over PBOC branches. See Guanyu Shenhua 
Jinrong Gaige, Zhengdun Jinrong Zhixu, Fangfan He Huajie Jinrong Fengxian De Tongzhi (关于
深化金融改革，整顿金融秩序，防范和化解金融风险的通知) [Notice on Deepening Financial 
Reform, Rectifying Financial Order, Preventing and Defusing Financial Risk] (promulgated by the 
Cent. Comm. of CPC and the State Council, Dec. 6, 1997), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/
64186/66688/4494459.html [https://perma.cc/GK9D-4LBM]. 
 228 See MA QINGQUAN ET AL., ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHI, DIYI JUAN (中国证券史, 第一
卷) [THE SECURITIES HISTORY OF CHINA, VOL. 1] 119–23 (2009) [hereinafter MA ET AL., VOL. 1]. 
 229 Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Guoying Qiye Gufenhua Shidian Zanxing Guiding (深圳經濟特區
國營企業股份化试點暫行規定) [Interim Provisions of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on the 
Experimentation of Shareholding System by SOEs) (promulgated by Shenzhen Mun. Gov’t, Oct. 
15, 1986) (Lawinfochina). 
230 See Carl. E. Walter, The Struggle over Ownership: How the Reform of State-Owned En-
terprises Changed China, 28 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 83, 89 (2010), http://rauli.cbs.dk/
index.php/cjas/article/viewFile/2669/3066 [https://perma.cc/W7AA-6CEC]. 
2016] Stock Market Development in China 313 
thirty-eight articles altogether. 231  All this legislation was rudimentary at 
best. The purpose was to put in place some rules governing company for-
mation while the major contents were the approval requirements and proce-
dures for share issues.232 Investor protection was not yet on the agenda and 
shareholders’ rights were barely mentioned. Even the most sophisticated 
regulation—in Shenzhen, which effectively copied Hong Kong’s—only 
vaguely stipulated shareholders’ rights to participate in management and 
supervision and to receive dividends and surplus.233 It did not provide what 
remedies were available to shareholders when their rights were infringed. 
Lastly, the constitutional legality of these local rules was questionable, and 
the central government later refused to recognize some companies that were 
set up according to these rules.234 
Regarding stock trading, the PBOC Shanghai Branch issued a docu-
ment to regulate the OTC market in 1987.235 In 1990, the government of 
Shanghai and in 1991, the Shenzhen government promulgated rules on the 
operation of the Stock Exchanges.236 The PBOC Shanghai Branch also is-
sued a separate document regulating securities listing and trading.237 These 
rules stipulated the requirement for information disclosure and prohibited 
insider trading and market manipulation, but lacked details.238 Again, inves-
tor protection was not yet a concern, illustrated by the requirement that 
listed companies were to disclose information to the government but not to 
investors.239 
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B. The Second Stage: Between 1992 and 2000 
Following the “share fever” triggered by Deng’s “Southern Tour,” a 
number of laws were enacted at the ministerial level. Among them, three 
documents issued by the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic 
System in May 1992 were most prominent.240 It was the riot in Shenzhen in 
August 1992, however, that prompted the leadership in Beijing to accelerate 
legislation and set up a regulatory system.241 The riot demonstrated that a 
chaotic market would not only be a risk to the financial system and eco-
nomic order, but also pose a serious threat to social and governmental sta-
bility. The top leadership believed that the lack of regulation was the cause 
for this mayhem; they felt an urgent need to regulate the stock market to 
instill order. 242 In October 1992, the State Council announced the estab-
lishment of a new regulatory system, consisting of the State Council Securi-
ties Committee (SCSC) and the CSRC.243 In December 1992, following the 
decision made by the 14th CPC Congress to expand the shareholding exper-
iment and to develop the stock market, the State Council published a docu-
ment proclaiming that a sound legal system was the precondition for a 
healthy market and called for speeding up legislation.244 It also clarified the 
responsibilities and powers of the SCSC and CSRC. The SCSC would be a 
meeting system of senior government officials, responsible for policy for-
mulation, coordination and the organization of laws and regulation drafting, 
while the CSRC would be the executive of the SCSC, responsible for enact-
ing regulatory rules and supervising the securities markets and intermediar-
ies.245 
1. Creating a Legal Framework 
After the SCSC and CSRC were set up, legislation was passed at great 
pace. The first, the Interim Regulations on the Administration of Share Issu-
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ance and Trading, was adopted in April 1993.246 This was a pillar of the le-
gal system until the Securities Law was enacted in 1998. It was comprehen-
sive, covering a wide range of issues, such as the conditions and approval 
procedures for companies to make public offerings, the documentation re-
quired for approval and compulsory contents of a prospectus, underwriting 
and subscription, conditions and procedure for listing, and depository and 
clearing rules.247 Listed companies were required to publish both annual 
and semi-annual reports and disclose material price-sensitive infor-
mation.248 Based on the City Code of the United Kingdom, rules on takeo-
vers were laid down. Insider trading, information misrepresentation, and 
manipulating share prices were prohibited, and penalties against such frauds 
were clearly spelled out. The CSRC was authorized to investigate viola-
tions. On paper, these provisions were “thorough and demanding,” compa-
rable to the securities regulations of developed economies.249 To implement 
this legislation, the SCSC and CSRC issued special rules on information 
disclosure and anti-securities fraud in 1993.250 
The SCSC and CSRC also promulgated a large number of regulations 
and rules to govern other issues, such as the organization and management 
of the stock exchanges, the regulation of securities companies and their 
businesses (like underwriting, proprietary trading, investment consulting, 
and fund management), and the qualification and disqualification of securi-
ties practitioners.251 Special rules were passed to regulate B shares (domes-
tically listed foreigner-owned shares) and overseas offerings and listings.252 
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Last but not least, an abundant number of normative documents, and notices 
were issued, dealing with ad hoc issues, responding to changes, or providing 
operational guidance.253 For example, by 1998 the CSRC had published sev-
en documents mandating the format and contents of an IPO prospectus, annu-
al and semi-annual reports, prospectus for rights issues, report for changes of 
shareholding, lawyers’ work reports, and so on.254 The total number of rele-
vant laws, regulations, and rules exceeded 250 by 1998.255 
In December 1993, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted the 
Company Law, finally providing a solid legal footing for company for-
mation and operation.256 This legislation, however, was criticized for its 
conservatism left over from the era of the Chinese planned economy.257 At 
the start, the law incongruously proclaimed that state assets of a company 
belonged to the state.258 Moreover, although two types of companies were 
allowed in general—a limited liability company (similar to a close or pri-
vate company) and a company limited by shares (equivalent to a joint stock 
or public company)—only SOEs enjoyed the privilege to be organized as a 
limited liability company with only one shareholder.259 In terms of investor 
protection, the law was lamentable. For example, it did not provide for di-
rectors’ fiduciary duties; many common measures for minority shareholder 
protection, such as accumulative voting, shareholders’ right to access com-
pany information, and the proposal and preemptive right, were absent;260 
shareholders also did not have recourse to remedies such as the shareholder 
derivative action and appraisal right.261 
Although other laws and regulations were passed with high efficiency, 
the adoption of the Securities Law was long delayed. Commencing as early 
as July 1992, the NPC Standing Committee took charge of drafting the 
                                                                                                                           
ing Offerings and Listings Outside China by Companies Limited by Shares] (promulgated by the 
State Council, Aug. 4, 1994) (Lawinfochina).  
 253 See Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure and Information in 
China’s Stock Markets, 88 GEO. L.J. 1919, 1922–23 (2000). 
 254 See id. at 1925–27. 
 255 See id. at 1923.   
 256 See id.; Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 127, 127 (1997). 
 257 See Howson, supra note 256, at 128, 172. 
 258 See Zhonghuo Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law 
of PRC] (promulgated by the  Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective 
July 1, 1994) art. 4 (Lawinfochina). 
 259 Id. art. 64. 
 260 See Howson, supra note 256, at 140–44, 147–50. 
 261 See Zhong Zhang, The Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in 
China: Why the Excitement Is Actually for Nothing, 28 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 174, 189–91 
(2011) [hereinafter Zhang, Shareholder Derivative Action]. 
2016] Stock Market Development in China 317 
law—the first instance in China’s legislative history.262 But bitter disputes 
on some key issues and a turf war between two departments of the NPC 
Standing Committee soon broke out. The legislative process stalled until top 
leadership intervened in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. The Law 
was eventually passed in December 1998 and took effect on July 1, 1999.263 
It was essentially a codification of previous regulations and rules on public 
offerings, underwriting, listing, trading, information disclosure, anti-fraud, 
takeover, stock exchanges, securities companies, and securities businesses. 
Some provisions were made to confirm policy changes, like abolishing the 
quota system for share issue and establishing a unified market regulator. 
There were also technical improvements, particularly in the area of takeo-
vers. Some controversial and unsettled issues, like OTC market regulation, 
were left untouched.264 Overall, the law was rigid and restrictive, reflecting 
the government’s approach of heavy regulation and control in the face of 
wild speculation and lawlessness in the market.265 Nevertheless, the enact-
ment of the Securities Law marked that a basic legal framework governing 
the stock market had been established. 
With regards to criminal legislation, the first major piece of legislation 
was a Decision passed by the NPC Standing Committee in 1995 to punish 
violations of the Company Law.266 The corporatization of SOEs created an 
uncertainty as to whether the criminal liabilities stipulated in the Criminal 
Law of 1979 against graft and bribe-taking by state personnel and SOE man-
agers were applicable to managers of listed SOEs.267 In the meantime, alt-
hough the Company Law stated that embezzlement and bribe taking by com-
pany managers were criminally punishable,268 neither the Company Law nor 
the Criminal Law specified the exact punishments. Hence, loopholes existed 
whereby miscreant managers might escape criminal punishment. To close 
them, the NPC adopted the Decision to specify punishments for those ac-
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tions. 269 In addition, the same Decision provided for punishments against 
fraudulent or unapproved public offerings and false disclosure of financial 
reports by listed companies.270 These provisions of the Decision were codi-
fied when the Criminal Law of 1979 was amended in 1997.271 The 1997 
amendment also added punishments for insider trading, divulging inside in-
formation, fabricating and spreading false information, and manipulating 
share prices by way of trading.272 In early 1993, the Interim Regulations on 
the Administration of Share Issuance and Trading and the special rules on 
anti-securities fraud criminalized these misdeeds,273 but they did not stipulate 
punishments. The 1997 amendment closed these remaining legislative loop-
holes. But new ones opened after the enactment of the Securities Law of 
1998, which designated more misdemeanors as criminally punishable without 
stipulating what the punishments would be.274 
2. Establishing a Centralized and Unified Regulatory System 
Despite the establishment of the SCSC and CSRC in 1992 as special-
ized regulators, the regulatory system remained fragmented and locally con-
trolled. The SCSC and CSRC were not the only regulators, as other minis-
tries shared responsibilities and power. The State Planning Commission had 
the mandate to formulate and distribute quotas for share issues; the PBOC 
was responsible for licensing and supervising securities institutions and in-
vestment funds; the Ministry of Finance was responsible for regulating the 
accounting sector.275 Other ministries overshadowed the CSRC, and its au-
thority to issue and enforce rules was questioned, as it was designated as a 
non-governmental institution with only an administrative rank of vice-
ministry.276 In terms of resources, the number of its employees was limited 
to only 100 and its funding was insecure.277 At the local level, the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were still under the control of their respec-
tive governments.278 Moreover, following the central government’s practice, 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen set up their own specialized regulators in 1993 and 
governments in other provinces and cities later followed suit.279 But these 
regulators were under the control of local governments and the CSRC had 
no jurisdiction over them.280 To sum up, the CSRC was weak, isolated in 
Beijing, and lacked authority. It even had trouble accessing information 
about the stock exchanges because it was not physically present and the 
requirement for the exchanges to report was regularly ignored.281 
A series of scandals led to changes. As explained earlier, the “327 gov-
ernment bond futures” scandal fully exposed pervasive mismanagement at 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the lax attitude towards regulation and 
risk control.282 The competition between Shanghai and Shenzhen to boost 
stock trading by using local securities companies and bank money to ma-
nipulate share prices further revealed the danger of leaving local govern-
ments in control. The central government first stripped the two municipal 
governments of control of the stock exchanges.283 In August 1996, the cen-
tral government amended and upgraded the provisional regulations on stock 
exchanges adopted in 1993 to permanent status, which now stated that stock 
exchanges were under the administration of the CSRC and the CSRC had 
the power, in consultation with the local governments, to nominate the 
chairman and vice chairman of the board of directors for election and to 
appoint the general and vice general managers.284 In July 1997, the General 
Office of the State Council gave notice that the two stock exchanges were to 
be under the “direct” administration of the CSRC and the CSRC was to 
have exclusive power over personnel issues.285 These changes were subse-
quently incorporated into the regulations. On August 14, 1997, the General 
Manager of the Shanghai Stock Exchange was replaced by an official from 
the CSRC, marking the end of local control over the stock exchanges.286 
The Asian Financial Crisis prompted further changes to the regulatory 
system. Witnessing that a weak financial sector could devastate the whole 
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economy of other Asian countries, the leadership in China decided it was 
time to put its own unruly financial system in some order. In November 
1997, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council held a na-
tional financial conference in Beijing where it decided, first, to centralize 
the administration and personnel management of the PBOC, state-owned 
commercial banks, and other financial institutions, and second, to enforce 
the principle of separated businesses, which forced commercial banks to 
divest their non-deposit-taking and lending businesses.287 Specifically in the 
securities sector, the CPC announced a new unified and centralized regula-
tory system.288 In April 1998, the SCSC was abolished and the CSRC was 
upgraded to the rank of a full ministry.289 The PBOC’s power of licensing 
and supervising securities institutions and investment funds were trans-
ferred to the CSRC.290 The quota system for share issues was abolished so 
that the State Planning Commission was no longer involved in the regula-
tion of the stock market. 291 In the meantime, the CPC decided that the 
CSRC should take over the existing local regulators and new ones should be 
set up across the country. By July 1999, all local regulators had been put 
under the control of the CSRC.292 A unified and centralized regulatory sys-
tem had been established. The CSRC’s authority over the stock market was 
no longer disputed, and it was a physical presence all over the country. 
C. The Stage Since 2000 
After the new system was established, the CSRC faced an urgent issue—
the deterioration in profit performance of listed companies. Despite the 
short history of the stock market, a large number of listed companies lost 
money by the end of the 1990s. By 2001, 150 companies, 12.9% of the to-
tal, encountered a loss.293 Some of them had been losing continually for 
years. In 1998 the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange came up with 
the Special Treatment (ST) label to mark companies having made continuous 
losses for two years and in the following year, the Particular Transfer (PT) 
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designation for companies making losses for three consecutive years. 294 
There were twenty-six ST companies in 1998 and by 2000 the number in-
creased to sixty-six.295 The number of PT companies increased from four in 
1999 to twenty by 2001.296 It had become apparent that merely listing SOEs 
on the stock exchanges would not improve their performance and the gov-
ernance of listed SOEs was in urgent need of improvement. Early in 1994, 
the Chinese government issued a document to regulate companies’ articles 
of association, but it was only applicable to companies issuing and listing 
shares on overseas stock exchanges and the purpose was to ensure those 
companies met the corporate governance standards of overseas markets.297 
In 1997, the CSRC adopted a similar document for companies listed on the 
domestic exchanges.298 In February 2000, Zhou Xiaochuan, a veteran bank-
er who was regarded as capable, reform-minded, and experienced in inter-
national finance, became the chairman of CSRC. He saw corporate govern-
ance as critical to a healthy market and identified it as a priority for CSRC 
to tackle.299 During his thirty-four-month tenure, two corporate governance 
initiatives were implemented.300 The first introduced an independent direc-
tor system. The CSRC issued a document in August 2001 decreeing that at 
least one-third of directors of a listed company should be independent by 
mid-2003.301 The second was the issuance in January 2002 of a corporate 
governance code for listed companies. Inspired by the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development’s Principles of Corporate Govern-
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ance, it was much more detailed and addressed problems that were particu-
larly serious to Chinese companies, such as the dominance of controlling 
shareholders, the prevalence of related-party transactions, the dependence 
of listed companies on their controlling shareholder for business and opera-
tion, and so forth.302 
Zhou Xiaochuan also emphasized the importance of law enforcement. 
But the sharp increase in enforcement activities from 2000 was driven more 
by scandal.303 The years 2000 and 2001 are remembered in the history of 
China’s stock market for the revelation of a series of outrageous scandals. 
Three types of scandals were especially notorious. The first was market 
manipulation, including trade-based, information-based, or both. Stock cor-
nering was the most popular trade-based manipulation, whereby a manipu-
lator secretly bought a large number of shares of a company using multiple 
trading accounts and then sold down after innocent investors were lured in 
and the share price was high enough. In information-based manipulation, 
different methods were used to propagate false information. A manipulator 
might procure the collusion of the top managers of a company or buy con-
trol of a company in order to disclose false information or spread rumors 
privately or through public media.304 The second type of fraud was infor-
mation falsification by listed companies, whereby accounting documents 
like sale contracts, invoices, and tax receipts were all faked. Individuals 
participated in such fabrication not only for market manipulation but also 
for other reasons, like meeting the minimum profit requirement for an IPO or 
secondary offering.305 The third was misappropriation, whereby a huge sum 
of money was channeled from a listed company to its controlling shareholder 
or other related party in the name of a “loan” or without any pretense.306 
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There are numerous examples of fraud. In October 2000, Caijing, a re-
spected business magazine, published an investigatory report on the shady 
fund management sector.307 December saw the debacle of the intricate and 
sprawling manipulation scheme of Zhongke Chuangye. 308 The audacious 
manipulation of Yi’an Keji collapsed after the CSRC announced an investi-
gation in April 2001.309 In August 2001, the CSRC issued a public criticism 
of Sanjiu Yiyao and its board of directors for not disclosing the misappropria-
tion of billions of RMB by its controlling shareholder.310 In the same month, 
the extraordinary story of a blue-chip, high-growth company, Yinguangxia, 
came to an abrupt end after Caijing discovered that its profits were com-
pletely fabricated.311 It was because of these scandals that the preeminent 
economist, Wu Jinglian, condemned the market as “worse than a casino,” a 
statement that resonated strongly with investors.312 
Amid a public outcry, the CSRC took action to investigate these scan-
dals. Punishments were meted out, helped by the revamped regulatory sys-
tem.313 With share prices dropping further after 2001, more scandals were 
exposed. Market manipulators found they were now in an unenviable posi-
tion in that, as retail investors withdrew from the market, they could not sell 
down the shares they had secretly accumulated.314 Instead, to maintain the 
high price of cornered stocks, more money was needed, which they now 
found difficult to access. 315 In the end, a large number of manipulation 
schemes failed and share prices collapsed. Securities companies and other 
fraudsters that had engaged in these manipulations accumulated huge losses 
and could not repay the funds they had appropriated from their clients or 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See Hu Ping & Jing Li, Jijin Heimu—Guanyu Jijin Xingwei De Yanjiu Baogao Jiexi (基金
黑幕－关于基金行为的研究报告解析) [An Inside Story of the Shady Investment Fund Sector—
An Analysis of Research Report on the Behavior of Investment Funds], CAIJING (Nov. 10, 2000), 
http://www.chinanews.com/2000-11-10/26/55317.html [https://perma.cc/V9CF-S6A4]. 
 308 See Shuli Hu et al., Zhuangjia Lu Liang (庄家吕梁之一) [Market Manipulator Lu Liang], 
CAIJING (Feb. 5, 2001), http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2001-02-05/110059991.html [https://perma.
cc/SY8S-TN5M]. 
 309 Li, Who Is Manipulating Yi’an Keji?, supra note 156.  
 310 Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Gongkai Piping Sanjiu Yiyao Ji Zhao Xinxian Deng Zerenren (中
国证监会公开批评三九医药及赵新先等负责人) [CSRC Publically Criticizing Sanjiu Yiyao 
and Zhao Xingxian and Other Responsible Persons], CHINA NEWS (Aug. 28, 2001), http://
www.chinanews.com/2001-08-28/26/116935.html [https://perma.cc/AV7Q-F5Y4]. 
 311 Huawei Ling & Shuo Wang, Yinguanxia Xianjing (银广夏陷阱) [The Trap of Yinguanxia], 
CAIJING (Aug. 5, 2001), http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20010807/92215.html [https://perma.cc/9A8U-
3JFK]. 
 312 See Kuhn, supra note 1; McGregor, supra note 1.  
 313 See Huang, supra note 306, at 110. 
 314 See Hu et al., supra note 308; Huawei Ling et al., Xiaoxiong Tang Wanxin (枭雄唐万新) 
[Tang Wanxin: The Villain], CAIJING (Jan. 11, 2006), http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20060111/
18512267862.shtml [https://perma.cc/JY9Z-MRS2].  
315 See Hu et al., supra note 308; Huawei Ling et al., supra note 314. 
324 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:283 
other sources.316 The government had to step in to plug the hole.317 The 
CSRC acted like a firefighter. It not only needed to investigate the scams and 
punish the culprits, but also to close down or restructure the bankrupt securi-
ties companies and clean up the mess that was left behind. In the process, var-
ious rules were adopted to better control the securities companies.318 
Another problem that needed to be tackled urgently was the misappro-
priation of corporate funds by controlling shareholders and listed compa-
nies’ guarantees for loans borrowed by their controlling shareholders or af-
filiates. The seriousness of the problem was highlighted by the scandal of 
Sanjiu Yiyao. More than RMB 2.5 billion, equivalent to 96% of its total net 
assets, was channeled from the listed company to its controlling shareholder 
and more than RMB 1.1 billion was “lent” to one of its sister companies.319 
In 2001, the CSRC instructed listed companies to recover “loans” borrowed 
by their controlling shareholders.320 But this was ignored, and more funds 
of more companies went missing. In 2003, the CSRC, with the newly estab-
lished State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration, tried to regulate 
inter-corporate loans, guarantees, and other financial transactions between 
listed companies and their controlling shareholders or affiliates, demanding 
that existing loans and guarantees be reduced by 30% every year.321 But 
again, these measures were ineffective. By the end of 2003, misappropria-
tion occurred in 737 listed companies out of a total of 1287, and the total 
amount of misappropriated funds reached RMB 113.2 billion, while the total 
profits of listed companies in that year were RMB 178.2 billion.322 It was on-
ly after the State Council’s intervention amid the serious crisis in the stock 
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market that progress was eventually made. It took three more years for most 
of the misappropriated funds to be returned. In the process, the government 
took criminal action against senior managers of controlling shareholders.323 
The misappropriation problem exemplified the inherent defects of 
Chinese listed companies. It exposed the scale of power abuse by control-
ling shareholders at the expense of public investors who invested their real 
money in listed companies. Early in 2000, the new CSRC chairman pro-
claimed the importance of protecting minority investors and improving the 
quality of listed companies.324 As scandals continued and the stock market 
faced a looming collapse, it became urgent to have better protection for in-
vestors and to cure the ills of listed companies. A copious number of rules, 
documents, and ad hoc notices were issued to address such issues as related-
party transactions, use of funds by listed companies, takeover and asset re-
structuring, independence of listed companies from their controlling share-
holder, and so on.325 Two high-level documents and one enactment by the 
CSRC were most important. In January 2004, the State Council published a 
document on how to resolve the problems in the securities markets and fur-
ther develop the markets, calling for an improvement in the quality of listed 
companies and the protection of small investors.326 In October 2005, the State 
Council endorsed a document proposed by the CSRC specifically on improv-
ing the quality of listed companies.327 Among the issues it covered were cor-
porate governance, internal control, transparency, related-party transactions, 
independence, and supervision of listed companies.328 In December 2004, 
the CSRC issued a regulation specifically to protect minority investors, giv-
ing them the right of veto on such important issues as new issuance of 
shares, rights issues and reorganization, and the right of cumulative and 
proxy voting; here, the power of independent directors was also strength-
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ened and fiduciary duties towards the company and minority shareholders 
were imposed on controlling shareholders.329 
To further strengthen the protection of minority shareholders and rein-
force the authority of the CSRC’s existing rules, the Company Law and Se-
curities Law were extensively amended in 2005.330 The revised Company 
Law confirmed the independent director system, the fiduciary duties of di-
rectors and controlling shareholders, the cumulative and proxy voting right, 
and rules regarding related-party transactions and reorganization, among 
others.331 It also introduced the derivative action; offered minority share-
holders appraisal rights, the right to propose resolutions to shareholders’ 
meetings, and to have access to internal information; reduced the sharehold-
ing threshold for calling an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting; and aug-
mented the powers of the supervisory board. 332  The Securities Law, as 
amended, confirmed the requirement of underwriter sponsoring for share 
issues, the third-party custody of investors’ funds, and rules regarding risk 
control and personnel qualification of securities companies; it also estab-
lished a fund for investor compensation in the event of securities company 
bankruptcy, offered investors the right to bring lawsuits against securities 
frauds, and strengthened the CSRC’s investigative powers.333 The Criminal 
Law was revised as well in 2006 to establish corporate managers’ personal 
liability for misappropriation and to close loopholes in criminal liability for 
information misrepresentation.334 Subsequently, rules previously adopted by 
the CSRC were updated in accordance with these revised statutes and the 
CSRC issued more operational rules.335 
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Hence, investor protection was improved considerably. Major defi-
ciencies in primary legislation were corrected and investors offered more 
legal rights. Regulations, rules, and normative documents for investor pro-
tection were abundant—the total number of which exceeded 1200.336 En-
forcement was also strengthened, as evidenced by both the input of re-
sources and output of CSRC enforcement activities. The era of the 1990s, 
when laws were largely unenforced, was gone. By 2006, a degree of order 
had been established and fraud that once plagued the market had been cur-
tailed noticeably. The Chinese stock market could no longer be said to be in 
a state of lawlessness. Nevertheless, the decline of share prices since 2010 
provoked a new public outcry over the dismal amount of dividends paid out 
by listed companies.337 In terms of securities fraud, insider trading (includ-
ing so-called “rat trading”338) became the focus of public indignation and 
the primary target of the CSRC’s enforcement action. 339 
III. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE GROWTH OF  
CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 
A. The Role of Investor Protection in the Growth of the  
Market Before Mid-2001 
1. The Irrelevance of Investor Protection 
Investor protection was hardly relevant in China’s stock market devel-
opment before mid-2001. China experienced bouts of “share fever,” one of 
which caused a riot, even before a basic legal and regulatory framework 
was in place.340 Certainly, those investors who frantically traded shares in 
1990 and those queuing for days to buy a subscription form in 1992 in 
Shenzhen did not believe substantive investor protection was necessary to 
engage in trade.341 In fact, it can be safely assumed that few of them under-
stood what a share of a company actually was, how a company operated, 
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and what risks would be involved. What some of them might have known 
was perhaps that their neighbors or friends had bought shares and made 
money. Many more might not even have been aware of such examples. 
They just followed suit with only a faint idea that acquiring shares could 
make money. 
Even after the CSRC was set up and major company and securities 
legislation was adopted, investor protection was still hardly relevant. There 
was no specific criminal legislation before 1995, the Securities Law was not 
enacted until 1998, the Company Law of 1993 was defective, and the legal 
rights and remedies critical for shareholder protection were glaringly ab-
sent.342 More importantly, all the laws and rules for investor protection were 
largely unenforced, as evidenced by the widespread and blatant frauds that 
took place. Even the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments organized ma-
nipulation to boost stock trading, and the two stock exchanges offered sup-
port.343 By the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, fraud (in particular 
market manipulation, false disclosure, and misappropriation) had become 
systemic. The magnitude of misappropriation has already been detailed.344 
For false disclosure, one study estimated that 72% of listed companies en-
gaged in such misconduct;345 for market manipulation, even staff from the 
CSRC openly admitted that at least 30% of stocks were actively manipulat-
ed in 2000;346 and another report revealed that the CSRC estimated 80% of 
stocks were manipulated in 2001.347 Observers of the market summarized 
that “China’s stock market is a notoriously corrupt place. Securities firms, 
investment funds, finance companies and rich individuals all manipulate 
prices and spread prodigious amounts of false information”348 and “insider 
trading and manipulation of the market have been conducted almost half-
openly”349 and were “something of an open secret.”350 
The proposition that laws were largely unenforced is further supported 
by various empirical studies that found few enforcement activities in the 
1990s. The number of cases under CSRC’s administrative penalty and 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s disciplinary actions against listed 
companies was a single digit every year between 1994 and 2000, while 
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there was an increase from 1998 in the number of cases investigated by the 
CSRC.351 On specific fraud, there was only sporadic enforcement against 
market manipulation, insider trading, and information misrepresentation by 
listed companies before 2001.352 
Why were laws for investor protection not enforced during this period? 
In China, where the rule of law has yet to be sufficiently established, laws 
that have been promulgated to be effective are not necessarily so in reality. 
Much depends on whether senior leaders enforce them seriously, which is in 
turn largely determined by the particular political, economic, and social cir-
cumstances of the time. In earlier days, prior to 1990, the stock market was 
seen as a liability rather than an asset to the economy.353 Even after the 
market was designated for SOE financing, the main concern was over the 
dangers that a bubble would cause to the financial system, to the economy, 
and to social stability. 354 As articulated earlier, this concern was under-
scored by the decrees and warnings, the People’s Daily editorial in 1996, 
and the punishments of several prominent bankers for market manipulation 
in 1997.355 Enforcement was used to prick the bubble rather than for inves-
tor protection. On the other hand, although fraud was discovered early in 
the stock market’s history, it was only beginning in 2000 that a series of 
shocking scandals were exposed to cause public outrage, and the market ran 
into crisis only after 2001.356 In a word, the government lacked motivation 
to enforce the laws because the stock market was economically insignificant 
and the government faced no political pressure from investors. 
The CSRC also lacked enforcement capacity during this period. There 
was no enforcement department in the CSRC until 1996, and once estab-
lished in 1996, the department had no more than thirty-three staff until 
2001. 357  The CSRC had no physical presence outside Beijing before 
1999.358 The CSRC could not even access information that it needed for 
legal actions. Local governments were interested in expanding their ex-
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changes and boosting trade rather than enforcing laws, because of the bene-
fits of increased tax revenue, economic growth, and political status brought 
by an enlarged exchange. The main concern for the central government was 
the financial, economic, and social disruption caused by a disorderly mar-
ket.359 Thus, it is not a surprise that before 1997, neither local governments 
nor the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges entered any sanctions 
against information misrepresentation.360 
2. Why the Market Grew While Investor Protection Remained Weak 
The behavior of those investors rushing to the market without the least 
concern for protection can be explained by the herding theory of behavioral 
finance. 361  Investors jumped on the investment bandwagon just because 
they saw other people buying shares. Such herd behavior is probably more 
pronounced and pervasive in China, where in a highly collective society 
with tight-knit social fabrics, information about peer behavior flows quickly 
and people feel more pressure to conform to collective norms.362 Behavioral 
finance also provides explanations for some other traits exhibited by Chi-
nese investors. For example, some retail investors pursued an investment 
strategy, colloquially called “dancing with [market] manipulators,”363 sig-
naling those investors’ overconfidence that they could beat the manipula-
tors. There were numerous stories about investors holding on to negative 
performing stocks for years, explicable perhaps by the prospect theory that 
investors have a tendency to avoid the negative utility of a prospective 
loss. 364  It is therefore possible that Chinese investors’ rationality was 
bounded.365 This bounded rationality is further compounded by the fact that 
individuals dominated the market in the 1990s, while institutional investors 
were few. These individuals were the first generation of investors with little 
experience. They paid little attention to a company’s fundamentals, but in-
stead followed intuition, rumors, inside information, and other people’s ac-
tions. They were especially prone to irrationality.366 
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Second, it is possible that fraudsters needed time to learn their trade 
and for their skills to spread, causing a time lag between the opening of the 
stock market and the prevalence of fraud. The fact that widespread frauds 
were discovered only from 2000 on supports this supposition. A stock mar-
ket, therefore, always has a grace period to grow before investor confidence 
is shaken by widespread fraud. During this period, law may be irrelevant. 
But drawing a conclusion on the experience of this period that investor pro-
tection is unnecessary would be wrong. 
Third, although bounded rationality and time lag could be common 
explanations for market growth, the growth of China’s stock market is fur-
ther underpinned by a unique factor. Following the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges’ decision to mark companies with two-year and three-year 
negative performance with an ST or PT label, the CSRC ruled in 2001 that 
trading of PT companies’ shares should be suspended and such companies 
be delisted if their financial condition did not recover within a year.367 Local 
governments thus sponsored a wave of so-called “asset restructuring” to 
bail out companies in financial difficulty.368 First, direct subsidies, under 
different names, were provided to listed companies and tax or other liabili-
ties were waived.369 Second, the controlling SOE shareholder of a listed 
company was instructed to waive debts owed to it by its subsidiary or to 
take over debt liabilities owed by its subsidiary to others; loss-making as-
sets were removed and new assets were inserted.370 Third, if a controlling 
SOE did not have the ability to bail out its listed subsidiary, shares owned 
by the SOE were sold to a private firm at a nominal price on the condition 
that the private firm insert new assets into the listed company. This is the 
so-called “backdoor listing,” a popular choice in China.371 Private firms had 
little chance to become listed through an IPO, so “back door listing” was 
attractive because of the potential opportunities to raise funds from the 
market or simply to gain the status and reputation of a listed company.372 
Some companies were also acquired by fraudsters and used as a tool for 
market manipulation, as the notorious scandals of Yi’an Keji and Zhongke 
Chuangye illustrated. 
Local governments were highly motivated to bail out listed companies. 
First, a listed company might be an important employer or source of tax 
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revenues for a local government. Second, a listed company was an im-
portant vehicle for fund raising, which local governments were reluctant to 
lose. Third, local governments simply did not want to lose face because ST, 
PT, and delisting showed them in a bad light.373 By 2001, around 680 listed 
companies, more than half of the total, had undergone some form of “asset 
restructuring”—in effect, a bailout. 374 Therefore, investors no longer need-
ed to worry that a company might fail—the downside risk of stock invest-
ment was removed, which is another explanation for growth in the market 
despite weak investor protection. 
A well-known study suggested that the quota system for share issuing 
created incentives for local governments to select viable companies for list-
ing because future allocations of quotas to a local area were linked to the 
past performance of companies.375 Considering the widespread fraud and 
corruption in the IPO process, this explanation for market growth is doubt-
ful. Falsification of information was especially serious in IPOs. One study 
found that of all CSRC’s penalties against accounting firms and accountants 
between 1994 and 2001, 62.5% were due to misconduct occurring in IP-
Os. 376  Moreover, the quota system created ample opportunities for rent 
seeking by government officials in selecting and approving companies for 
listing.377 Therefore, even if quota allocation was meant to be merit-based, 
the system could not ensure only viable companies were listed, as evi-
denced by the fact that so many companies had to be bailed out soon after 
being listed. 
Financial repression in China also contributed to market growth during 
this period. Because interest rates set by the government were low and capi-
tal control restricted overseas investment, Chinese people had no choice but 
to invest in the domestic stock market.378 But the question is, when the risk 
of losing money in the market was high, why did people not leave their 
money in banks? There, at least, it would not disappear. It is arguable that 
there existed separate, deeper reasons behind the financial repression. 
Bounded rationality, inexperience, bailouts by government, and a time lag 
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between the opening of the stock market and the prevalence of fraud might 
be fundamental to the growth of the market. These factors, however, could 
not sustain market growth infinitely, as the history of China’s stock market 
development after mid-2001 demonstrates. 
B. Investor Protection and the Stock Market Crisis Between 2001 and 2005 
Why did the stock market run into a severe crisis between 2001 and 
2005 when China’s macro economy was at its best? Many so-called “opin-
ion leaders” blamed the State Council’s decision in June 2001 to sell down 
state shares on the exchanges,379 which was commonly accepted. In China, 
however, there are too many “opinion leaders” whose words should not be 
taken too seriously, and as a result, the claim that the crisis was caused by 
the decision to sell down state shares is questionable. First, the policy to sell 
was in fact adopted in 1999,380 but share prices rose continuously until June 
2001. 381  Second, the State Council’s selling scheme was modest. Only 
companies undertaking an IPO were supposed to sell, but not those that had 
already been listed. The number of state shares to be sold was just 10% of 
the number of new shares to be issued. In addition, funds raised were to be 
transferred to the National Social Security Fund, of which part would be re-
invested in the market.382 Third, share prices rose on June 13, 2001, when 
details were publicized by Xinhua News Agency, and throughout June and 
July there was only a small drop with occasional rises.383 Fourth, although 
share prices rose sharply following the government’s announcement in Oc-
tober 2001 to suspend and in June 2002 to terminate the scheme, the rallies 
were short-lived and the downward trend continued until the end of 2005.384 
Lastly, observers have also argued that selling state shares at market price 
was unfair to public investors, causing them to withdraw from the market. 
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But the Hong Kong market, where many SOEs had been listed and the sell-
ing scheme did not stop, was not affected by such practice.385 
The claim that selling down state shares was responsible for the crisis 
is not consistently supported by the evidence. It is likely that the market fell 
in 2001 because the bubble became too big and a large number of compa-
nies reported losses.386 Nevertheless, although statistically hard to prove, it 
is credible that securities fraud was also responsible for the crisis. First, the 
exposure of fraud caused a sharp fall in the share price and market value of 
the companies implicated. For example, the price of Yi’an Keji plummeted 
from its highest point of RMB 126.31 on February 17, 2000 to less than 
RMB 10 in January 2002, and the share price of Yinguangxia plunged from 
more than RMB 33 in August 2001 to just over RMB 2 at the end of Janu-
ary 2002 and reached the 10% daily limit for fifteen straight days. In anoth-
er example, a company, Tuo Pu Software, reported huge profits in 2001, but 
huge losses two years later, prompting a subsequent investigation by the 
CSRC, which revealed that around RMB 1.4 billion—more than the total of 
its net assets—had been misappropriated. 387 The share price of the compa-
ny was RMB 48 in July 2000, but less than RMB 5 on June 30, 2004.388 
Another company, Pi Jiu Hua, announced in December 2003 that “its 
chairman had disappeared” and subsequently the company disclosed that it 
had offered to guarantee RMB 1.787 billion of bank loans, resulting in a 
share price drop from nearly RMB 17 in December 2003 to just over RMB 
3 as of July 11, 2004. 389 In April 2004, De Long Group, a notorious private 
conglomerate which acquired a web of financial institutions and bought 
control of three listed companies for manipulation, finally crumbled, wiping 
out RMB 20 billion of market value in ten trading days.390 
These cases showed that scandals had a devastating effect on the share 
price and market value of a company. One study identified 212 corporate 
scandals (defined as an enforcement action taken by the securities regula-
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tors or courts) in the stock market between 1997 and 2005.391 Hence, the 
total impact of scandals on market performance was substantial. They were 
directly responsible for the fall of stock indices and loss of market capitali-
zation during this period.392 Moreover, a scandal not only affected the stock 
involved, but also shook the whole market. For example, after the scandal 
of Yinguangxia was publicized, the Component Index of Shenzhen—where 
the company was listed—lost significant value on the following trading day, 
whereas the Index moved narrowly during the previous trading week. It is 
very possible that the sudden plunge might be caused by the revelation of 
the scandal. Because there were so many similar cases, the market was 
rocked repeatedly and share prices were hit continually. As a result, scan-
dals were also indirectly responsible for the fall of the market. Eventually, 
investors found that share investment was too risky and decided to leave the 
market. The Chinese stock market was not just “worse than a casino,” but it 
also had a reputation as “a minefield full of traps”—one trip and an investor 
would be “blasted to pieces.”393 Faced with such a high and dangerous risk, 
investors understandably withdrew from the market. Fraud thus eroded in-
vestor confidence in the market, causing them to flee in droves. Lastly, one 
type of fraud, misappropriation, was a cause for the poor profitability of 
listed companies. In 2003, 70% of ST companies had experienced misap-
propriation and misappropriation was an important reason for the failure of 
those delisted PT companies.394 If low profitability of listed companies was 
a cause for the crisis, the fraud of misappropriation must also be blamed. 
To conclude, although there are other explanations, such pervasive fraud 
significantly contributed to the market crisis. The exposure of these scandals 
was not only responsible for the fall of stock indices and loss of market value, 
but also damaged investor confidence. Misappropriation was also a cause for 
the poor profit performance of listed companies. The experience of the Chi-
nese stock market during this period thus demonstrates that investor protec-
tion is essential for sustaining the growth of a market. China’s experience 
demonstrates that investors are not just vulnerable to unscrupulous corporate 
managers, but also to miscreant stock traders. To develop a stock market, it is 
crucial to protect investors from abuse by stock traders. 
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C. Investor Protection and the Revival and Survival  
of the Market Since 2006 
The recovery of the market in 2006 developed into an enormous bub-
ble and soon burst. Nevertheless, the Chinese stock market has since 
reached a new height, and major state-owned “national champions” have 
been listed.395 The revival was commonly attributed to non-tradable share 
reform,396 but this view is logically flawed and inconsistent with the facts. 
According to the same logic that the market collapsed in the previous period 
because of the fear of excessive share supply, the non-tradable share reform 
should have dampened rather than stimulated the market. After all, non-
tradable shares could then be sold on the exchanges after they became trad-
able and the market would be flooded. Indeed, after the reform scheme was 
announced in April 2005, share prices dropped further until the end of 
2005.397 It should be noted that during the 2008 crash and again between 
2010 and 2014 when the market was in another bear, selling by owners of 
previously non-tradable shares was blamed.398 
Certainly, bounded rationality could again be an explanation. Perhaps 
the turnaround also had to do with the fact that shares became very cheap 
after falling for four and half years. But the more baffling question is why 
investors were no longer concerned about fraud. Why did investors become 
irrational after 2005? As described earlier, it is noticeable that investor pro-
tection improved considerably by 2006. 399  Securities fraud that once 
plagued the market had been greatly curbed and a degree of law and order 
established in the market.400 It is plausible that the market resurged in 2006 
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because of the improvement of investor protection. Without such improve-
ment, the revival might not have been possible. If securities fraud was as 
widespread as it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it would be perplex-
ing that the market could survive the spectacular crash in 2008 and the bear 
market between 2010 and 2014. 
After the scandal of Kelon Group broke out in August 2005,401 major 
fraud had been exposed. The devastating effect of scandals had tapered off. 
In the end, most of the companies affected by fraud were bailed out and 
saved from being delisted, avoiding a fatal consequence for investors.402 By 
the end of 2005, many of those companies had been “restructured” or a re-
structuring plan had been put in place. A large number of criminals were 
sent to prison. Governments also saved securities companies from bank-
ruptcy and compensated investors for their misappropriated funds and 
stocks. After the intervention by the State Council with the use of criminal 
sanctions, their campaign to force misappropriated funds of listed compa-
nies to be returned was well underway.403 
Meanwhile, multiple laws, regulations, and rules were adopted to pro-
vide more protection for vulnerable investors. As a result, minority share-
holders’ legal rights were greatly enhanced. Various indicators suggest that 
by 2006, shareholders’ rights in China were comparable to or even more 
generous than those of major developed economies. According to Franklin 
Allen, China’s “anti-director rights index” was three in 2000.404 Although 
Allen’s interpretation of Chinese laws might be inaccurate, the total score 
after error compensation would still be three, falling in the middle among 
those countries studied by Rafael La Porta. After the Company Law of 2005 
introduced the derivative action and cumulative voting, 405 China’s score 
would increase to five, among the highest of all countries.406 Second, in the 
“anti-self-dealing index” compiled by Simeon Djankov, which is regarded 
as “better grounded in theory than the index of anti-director rights,”407 Chi-
na scored 0.76, lower than the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, but com-
parable to Australia, Ireland, and Israel, and higher than the United States 
and Canada.408 Third, in the shareholder protection index compiled by John 
Armour, which is comprised of ten variables and covered the period be-
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tween 1995 and 2005, China ranked sixth among twenty countries studied, 
only after the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Japan, and Cana-
da. 409  China’s score might not reflect the improvements brought by the 
Company Law of 2005 and the Securities Law of 2005, as it did not change 
after 2003. Otherwise, China’s score could be even higher after 2005. 
Not only were investors offered more legal rights, but changes made in 
other areas also enhanced their protection. For example, to prevent securi-
ties companies from misappropriating their clients’ funds, the CSRC de-
creed in 2004 that investors’ funds be deposited in commercial banks rather 
than with securities companies. The Securities Law of 2005 formally stipu-
lated this requirement. 410  Since then, securities companies have all but 
stopped misappropriating their clients’ funds. The same law provided that 
one investor could only open one trading account and the name of the trad-
ing account and the investor’s name should be identical.411 As a result, it is 
much more difficult for manipulators to corner a stock by using multiple 
trading accounts to hide the fraud. The Securities Law of 2005 also greatly 
increased the use of the penalties for disqualification, suspension, or revoca-
tion of business licenses—the number of circumstances under which such 
penalties could be used increased from five to twenty-seven.412 These penal-
ties would have a stronger deterrent effect than administrative fines, which 
in most cases were a relatively small amount (at most, RMB 300,000 for 
individuals and RMB 600,000 for legal persons). 413 The revision of the 
Criminal Law in 2006 made directors and other senior managers of listed 
companies or the controlling shareholders criminally liable for misappropri-
ation, even if they gained no personal benefit.414 
Enforcement was also strengthened through a higher input of resources 
and output of enforcement activities. First, the CSRC’s enforcement de-
partment branched out of Beijing after taking over local regulators in 1999. 
In 2001, the enforcement units of nine major local regulators were upgraded 
to become a bureau directly under the CSRC’s control.415 In the same year, 
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a specialized enforcement bureau for investigating insider trading and mar-
ket manipulation was set up at the CSRC’s headquarters in Beijing, and the 
total number of enforcement staff at its headquarters increased by more than 
50%. The total number of enforcement staff in the whole system increased 
to more than 270.416 A specialized bureau for investigating securities crimes 
with six local divisions was established in 2002 by the Ministry of Public 
Security.417 In 2007, the CSRC’s enforcement system was overhauled again. 
Investigation and adjudication were separated and a new department was set 
up solely for trials and making penalty decisions. 170 employees, nearly 
three times the previous figure, were added to the investigation departments 
in Beijing and 110 were added at the local level. The total number of staff 
for investigation increased to about 600, nearly twenty times the figure in 
1999.418 In addition, the CSRC was offered more investigative power by the 
Securities Law of 2005, including the power to inspect and freeze bank ac-
counts and securities trading accounts, to seize assets, property, and evi-
dence; and to restrict securities trading.419 Furthermore, CSRC’s capacity to 
detect fraud was also enhanced. For example, local regulators were required 
to undertake regular inspection of listed companies and securities institutions; 
both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges set up a surveillance department 
and sophisticated computer software was installed to monitor abnormal trad-
ing and price movements in real time. This surveillance system is now a key 
instrument for detecting insider trading and market manipulation.420 
From the output perspective, various studies found that enforcement 
activities increased markedly from 2001. According to GTA’s database, the 
yearly figure of sanctions imposed by the CSRC and the two stock ex-
changes increased from a single digit before 2001 to seventy-six per year in 
2001 and averaged seventy-seven per year between 2001 and 2005.421 Other 
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studies painted a similar picture. For example, data collected by Katharina 
Pistor and Chenggang Xu indicated that sanctions by the regulators and 
stock exchanges more than quadrupled in 2001 from the previous year’s 
figure; 422 Luo Peixing, in his study of law enforcement against listed com-
panies for information misrepresentation, found that the sanctions by the 
CSRC and stock exchanges more than doubled in 2000 and doubled again 
in 2001.423 Though it has been argued that the number of enforcement ac-
tions was still too low in light of the total number of listed companies, there 
is no doubt that enforcement intensified considerably after 2000.424  En-
forcement activities increased further after 2005 and the total number of 
sanctions by the CSRC and the two stock exchanges have since exceeded 
100 every year.425 
As a result of all these efforts to enhance investor protection, the scale 
and seriousness of market fraud have decreased significantly since 2006. 
First, the once-ubiquitous stock-cornering and the audacious fraud of ac-
quiring listed companies for manipulation have largely disappeared, as has 
the misappropriation of clients’ funds and stocks by securities companies. 
Despite this progress, there are still two types of widespread market manipu-
lation. One is “pump and dump,” whereby manipulators make “buy” recom-
mendations or disseminate false information to boost the share price of a 
company and then secretly sell the shares that they have previously bought.426 
The other is the so-called “short swing manipulation,” whereby manipulators 
create false trading activities and rig price movements by placing false orders 
or using other tactics.427 But, judging from media reports, even these types 
of manipulation have decreased significantly and the culprits have been se-
verely punished by Chinese authorities. For example, in a “pump and 
dump” case, the owner of an investment advising company was sentenced 
to seven years in prison, profits of RMB 125 million were confiscated, fines 
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of RMB 125 million were imposed, the company’s license was revoked, 
and the owner was banned for life from the securities business.428 
Second, although there are still occasional news reports about control-
ling shareholders stealing funds from listed companies, the days of wide-
spread theft—when 737 out of 1287 companies experienced such theft—are 
gone. 429  Third, information misrepresentation is still a serious problem. 
Companies still invent profits, and a large number still engage in other types 
of misrepresentation, indicated by the large number of sanctions handed out 
by the CSRC and stock exchanges each year.430 Compared to when 72% of 
listed companies were estimated to have engaged in false disclosure, how-
ever, it is reasonable to believe that the situation has improved.431 Indeed, 
the chief accountant of the CSRC even claims that more than 90% of finan-
cial information disclosed by listed companies is essentially credible. 432 
Fourth, insider trading has appeared to be rampant and become a focus of 
public indignation. There has been a significant increase in enforcement 
actions against insider trading since 2008, accounting for more than half of 
the total sanctions imposed by the CSRC.433 Rather than indicating a deteri-
orated situation, however, this increase should be seen as a result of better 
detection and greater determination to crack down on insider trading. Even 
a city mayor was sentenced to prison for insider trading.434 Arguably, insid-
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er trading has a less obvious and immediate effect on investors’ confidence, 
as insider trading can be seen as victimless. All in all, the scale and serious-
ness of market fraud has decreased considerably since 2006 and it is now no 
longer true that the stock market is lawless. In contrast to its denunciation in 
2001 as “worse than a casino,” the stock market was extolled in 2010 by 
Wu Zhipan, an authority on Chinese financial law and Vice President of 
Peking University, as being “the most transparent and efficient market with 
the highest degree of rule of law” in China.435 
In sum, the stock market rebounded in 2006 after major scandals were 
exposed and the impact on share prices tapered off. More importantly, by 
2006, investor protection had greatly improved and the scale and serious-
ness of securities fraud had significantly decreased. It is after this improve-
ment that the market recovered and boomed. Without it, it is reasonable to 
question whether the market would have resurged in 2006 and survived the 
2008 crash and the prolonged bear market between 2010 and 2014. The ex-
perience of China’s stock market between 2006 and 2009 again testifies to 
the importance of investor protection for sustaining market growth. 
D. Investor Protection and the Bear Market Between 2010 and 2014 
1. Corporate Profitability, Investment Return, and the Bear Market 
After the global economic recession and ensuing market collapse in 
2008, the stock market experienced a brief rally after the government in-
jected RMB 4 trillion to stimulate the economy.436 From early 2010, how-
ever, share prices began to taper and fall, heralding another bear market that 
lasted until the end of 2014.437 In response to this bear market, the govern-
ment froze IPOs and market growth stalled.438 As the value of stocks evapo-
rated, investors again became very angry and opinion leaders were increas-
ingly vocal in their criticism of the market and the government’s handling 
of the situation. This time, however, the public’s anger and criticism seemed 
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to center on the market’s low investment return, especially the dismal 
amount of dividends paid out by listed companies.439 
In the wake of the bear market, there was much media publicity about 
the poor performance of China’s stock markets in investment return. For 
example, in July 2013, it was reported that in just four years, the mainland 
Chinese “market ha[d] lost more money for investors than any other in the 
world;”440 another report indicated that between 1993 and 2013 the MSCI 
China Index, including dividend payments, gained merely 14%, and inves-
tors earned less than 1% a year investing in Chinese stocks.441 China’s stock 
market, however, is highly volatile, and an assessment of market perfor-
mance based on share prices at one point in time is not really meaningful. 
For instance, in contrast with reported poor performance, the MSCI China 
Index returned 680% between November 2001 and October 2007.442 None-
theless, measured by the amount of dividends paid, an important source of 
investment return, the performance of the mainland Chinese market is in-
deed extraordinarily poor. In the 1990s, few companies paid cash dividends. 
Even by 1999, 59% companies did not pay any kind of dividends (cash or 
bonus shares).443 The proportion of companies paying dividends increased 
in the 2000s, but performance was still poor. Overall, the average annual 
dividend/price ratio of the mainland Chinese market was just over 0.75% 
between 1990 and 2010—the worst by far of the twelve major markets from 
both emerging and developed economies.444 Following the CSRC’s effort to 
encourage companies to pay more dividends and the fall of share prices, 
dividend yields have increased over the last couple years. The ratio in-
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creased to 1.04% in 2009, 1.14% in 2010, and 1.82% in 2011.445 In 2012, 
the CSRC announced that the average dividend yield of the top performing 
300 blue-chip companies reached 2.34% in 2011, exceeding that of the S&P 
500 in the United States. 446  The CSRC thus encouraged people to buy 
shares, proclaiming that China’s stock market had a value for long-term 
investment. 
But this claim was misleading. First, much of the dividends paid were 
from a small minority of big companies, primarily the five largest state-
controlled banks. Indeed, the “big five” banks contributed 48% of the total 
dividend in 2012. 447  Excluding banks, the dividend yield of the market 
would be much lower. Yet, banks’ share prices were among the lowest. For 
banks, their prospects are dim. Non-performing loans are increasing follow-
ing years of binge lending.448 In addition, the guaranteed interest rate mar-
gin and oligopolistic market position are no longer tenable if the banking 
sector is liberalized as expected.449 On the other hand, risk-free rates of re-
turn are much higher in China. Even the government-set, one-year deposit 
interest rate has been above 3% since April 2011.450 As a point of compari-
son, the yield of one-year treasury bills in the United States did not exceed 
0.5% from 2010 to the end of 2014.451 The market interest rates in China 
are even higher than the official ones. The days when Chinese people could 
only deposit their money in banks or invest in stocks or bonds are gone. In 
addition to investing in the booming real estate market, they could buy var-
ious “wealth management products” originated by banks, invest in different 
types of funds sponsored by non-bank financial institutions, and even lend 
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their money to private financiers. The size of this so-called “shadow bank-
ing” in China tripled between 2008 and 2012 to RMB 20 trillion.452 Rates of 
return varied, but even the safest deposit-equivalent, “wealth management 
products” originated by banks yielded around 5% annually.453 It is mislead-
ing to compare dividend yields between China and the United States with-
out considering the risk-free rates of return—the former is still considerably 
lower than the latter in China. It is thus understandable why Chinese inves-
tors withdrew from the stock market in such numbers. 
Another major source of investment return is capital gain. For growth 
companies with high profitability, retaining profits for business expansion is 
a better way to reward shareholders. If the low dividend yield of the Chi-
nese market was due to growth companies retaining profits for efficient use, 
this would actually have benefitted investors. Unfortunately, this was not 
the case. First, a large number of companies paid no dividend simply be-
cause they made little or no profit. Between 2008 and 2010, 710 companies 
paid dividends each year, while 516 companies paid no dividend at all in 
any of these years.454 Of these 516 companies, 72.77% experienced a loss in 
at least one year,455 and 153 were ST companies with no profit to distrib-
ute.456 Second, the profitability of companies paying no dividend was much 
lower as a whole. In 2010, the median return on assets (ROA) and ROE for 
companies paying dividends was 4.87% and 8.67%, respectively, while the 
figure for companies paying no dividend was 2.10% and 5.22%, respective-
ly.457 Third, it is peculiar that in China, growth companies tend to pay divi-
dends and companies paying no dividends do not record much growth. In 
2010, the average sale and net asset growth rate for companies paying divi-
dends was 20.16% and 13.33%, while the figure for companies paying no 
dividend was 9.41% and 2.63%.458 This oddity is due to the CSRC’s effort 
to compel companies to pay dividends. Responding to public outcry, the 
CSRC introduced a rule in 2008 that companies could only raise new capi-
tal on the market if they paid cash dividends of no less than 30% of their 
distributable profits continuously for three years. 459  Nevertheless, only 
                                                                                                                           
 452 See JOE ZHANG, INSIDE CHINA’S SHADOW BANKING: THE NEXT SUBPRIME CRISIS?, at vii 
(2013).  
 453 Id. at 116. 
 454 Yang Yang, 56 Zhi A Gu Pingjun Sannian Guxilu Chao 2 percent (56只 A股平均三年股
息率超 2%) [56 A Stocks’ Dividend Yield Exceeding 2 Percent], 45 GUSHI DONGTAI FENXI 85 
(STOCK MARKET TREND ANALYSIS WEEKLY) (2011). 
 455 SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RES. INST., supra note 444, at 22. 
 456 Id. 
 457 Id. 
 458 Id. 
 459 Guanyu Xiugai Shangshi Gongsi Xianjin Fenhong Ruogan Guiding De Jueding (中国证券
监督管理委员会关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定) [Decision on Amending Sev-
346 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:283 
growth companies have profits to distribute. It is clear that, far from being 
in high growth with high profitability, companies paying no dividends actu-
ally had poor operational and financial performance. These companies 
would not truly bring investors capital gains. 
Ultimately, investment return on the stock market is determined by the 
profitability potential of a listed company. Profitability determines not only 
the dividend yield, but also the size of capital gains. Without the support of 
profitability, the high price of a company’s stock would be an untenable 
bubble. How have Chinese companies fared in profitability? In the 1990s, 
there was a common saying about listed companies: “First year profit, sec-
ond year even, and third year losses.” 460 Listed companies were described 
as “a capital-destroying machine” and abundant capital raised from the 
market was wasted or simply disappeared.461 One study found that some 
70% of listed companies were actually destroying value, in the sense that 
profits created by these companies were lower than the opportunity cost of 
the equity capital they owned.462 The weighted average return on equity 
(WAROE) published by the CSRC was 7.63% in 2000,463 lower than that of 
non-listed companies and much lower than 19.1% of the largest 1000 listed 
companies from developed countries and 14.62% of the largest 200 compa-
nies from emerging markets.464 The WAROE decreased further to 5.35% 
and the ROA was only 3.02% in 2001, while the official interest rate for 
one-year bank loans was 5.85%.465 
The WAROE gradually increased from 2003, exceeding 10% in 2006 
and reaching the all-time high of 14.7% in 2007.466 It then crashed in 2008, 
recovered in 2009, but dropped again from 2011, staying at 13.35% in 
2012.467 Admittedly, this figure is much better than in the 1990s and early 
2000s, but corporate profitability is still not encouraging. First, other re-
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search suggests that the average ROE of listed companies is actually much 
lower than the official WAROE. One study found that the average ROE of 
Chinese companies was only 7.83% in 2010, but the figure of listed compa-
nies in the United States was 10.71%.468 A study by the All-China Federa-
tion of Industries and Commerce (ACFIC) indicated that, excluding ST 
companies and companies listed on the ChiNext, the average ROE was 
11.14% in 2010, 9.85% in 2011, and 7.6% in 2012, confirming the down-
ward trend suggested by the official WAROE figure. The median ROA was 
only 5.58% in 2012, again less than the official interest rate for one-year 
bank loans.469 Second, like dividend payments, a few large companies made 
the lion’s share of profits. The top ten most profitable companies, which 
included seven banks, accounted for more than 70% of the profits made by 
all listed companies in the first half of 2009 and 50% in 2012.470 The aver-
age ROE of the seven banks was almost 22% in 2012.471 Excluding the top 
ten, corporate profitability would be much lower. Third, along with increased 
ROE, the leverage of listed companies has surged since the mid-2000s. The 
average liability/asset ratio was less than 50% in 1998, but increased to 
86.76% in 2010 and 84.24% in 2011.472 This increase in ROE was partially 
caused by heightened leverage, which is no longer sustainable in light of the 
current high level. Fourth, the ability of Chinese companies to sustain high 
profitability is weak, as the number of companies with ROE above 10% 
continuously for five years was only 6.66% in 2010, less than half of the 
percentage of listed companies in the United States.473 
It is now clear that for a long time corporate profitability was low and 
the stock market was in a bubble. This explains why the market was so 
speculative. Because of low corporate profitability, long-term investment 
was infeasible. The only chance for investors to make profits was to specu-
late on price movements. The bear market from 2001 to 2005 could be 
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somehow seen as a major correction of the bubble. Although profitability 
increased in 2006 and 2007, the enormous surge in prices outgrew increased 
profits by a massive scale, resulting in the subsequent crash. Since then, the 
profitability of listed companies has declined. The economic stimulation in 
2009 had only a short-term impact on corporate profitability, but hugely 
inflated share prices.474 Another bubble arose and the subsequent fall was a 
correction, sustained by declining corporate profitability. In the meantime, 
investors had more alternative investment opportunities with higher rates of 
return. Ultimately, the bear market since 2010 is underscored by the low 
and declining profitability of listed companies. 
2. Reasons for the Low Corporate Profitability 
There are multiple reasons why profitability of listed companies in 
China is low,475 but weak investor protection is a significant one. Certainly, 
the widespread misappropriation of listed companies’ assets by their con-
trolling shareholders seriously hurt profitability. Although such misappro-
priation has been reduced since 2006, weak investor protection harms prof-
itability in other ways. China’s stock market has long been dominated by 
SOEs. Although the number of listed SOEs had decreased to 47% of the 
total by the end of 2011, they still accounted for 90% of total assets, 86% of 
total revenues and profits, and 74% of total market capitalization.476 Listing 
was supposed to improve SOE governance, but serious problems remain. One 
is the endemic corruption in the form of bribes and embezzlement among 
corporate managers. For instance, of the three SOEs monopolizing the oil 
and gas production sector, two had their senior managers arrested for cor-
ruption, and the chairman of one company was sentenced to death with re-
prieve.477 The “big four” state-owned banks were riddled with corruption 
and scandals continue after their listing.478 There is serious corruption also 
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present in many other “national champions” such as China Mobile, Chalco 
(China Aluminum), and COSCO (China Ocean Shipping).479 These are only 
the cases that have been exposed, and these companies—China’s strategic 
SOEs under the Central Committee of CPC and State Council’s close moni-
toring—are regarded as the best governed in the state sector. It is not an ex-
aggeration to say that corruption is endemic in the SOE sector. The second 
problem is waste, which has occurred in the form of grandiose office build-
ings with opulent decoration, luxury limousines, and incessant lavish ban-
quets with top-shelf wine and liquor, which are routinely reported in the 
news media.480 The third problem is chronic overinvestment and overcapac-
ity, and the SOE-dominated steel industry is a prime example. Because of 
overcapacity, this sector as a whole experienced a loss for nearly two years 
prior to August 2013.481 The top ten loss-making listed companies in 2012 
were all SOEs, and five of them were from the steel industry.482 Basically, 
SOE senior managers’ top priority is size growth (empire-building), rather 
than returns for shareholders. Fourth, there are too many cases of misman-
agement, the cost of which is enormous. One scandal involving gambling in 
oil derivatives by a Singapore-listed Chinese SOE caused losses of $550 
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million, only surviving after being bailed out by its controlling sharehold-
er.483 Another Hong Kong-listed SOE engaged in foreign exchange gam-
bling and lost $2 billion and again had to be bailed out by its controlling 
shareholder. COSCO recorded the biggest loss in the Mainland stock mar-
ket in both 2011 and 2012, totaling RMB 20 billion due to mismanagement 
and corruption.484 
Though the abuse of power by controlling shareholders to plunder 
listed companies has abated, abuse of power by corporate managers to ben-
efit themselves and mismanagement both remain at SOEs. This suggests 
that investor protection is still extraordinarily weak in China. Corporate 
profitability suffers from these misdemeanors and market growth is con-
strained. This experience again demonstrates the importance of law for 
stock market development. 
IV. THE ISSUE OF CAUSALITY AND MARKET GROWTH 
A. The Causality Between Law and Market Growth 
If investor-protection law must be strong for stock market develop-
ment, there arises the question of why investor protection varies in different 
countries and how the law develops. Is it true that the enhancement of law 
is caused by market growth, as is suggested in the United States and United 
Kingdom?485 Or is the strength of investor protection in a country prede-
termined by its legal origin, as is proposed by Rafael La Porta?486 Or is it 
dictated by modern politics?487 
China’s experience clearly indicates that, although law is important for 
sustaining market growth, the trajectory of development is market growth 
first, followed by law. The shareholding system and the stock market emerged 
and grew in the 1980s when a basic legal and regulatory framework was ab-
sent and investor protection was nonexistent. Though the CSRC was set up 
and laws were gradually put in place after 1992, they were rudimentary—
laws for investor protection were basically unenforced until the severe crisis 
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broke out in the early 2000s,488 but the market nevertheless grew rapidly. 
Investor protection improved only after the crisis happened and the market 
had grown to a significant scale. 
China’s experience thus supports the proposition that law is strength-
ened as a result of market growth. Why did market growth lead to stronger 
law in China? Noticeably, the government’s decision in 1992 to establish a 
legal and regulatory system was prompted by the “riot” in Shenzhen, the 
market bubble, and the excess of shares issues triggered by Deng Xiao-
ping’s “Southern Tour.”489 Leaders in Beijing clearly saw the danger that an 
uncontrolled stock market posed to the economy and society. Their motiva-
tion was to maintain the economic order and social stability that a rapidly 
developing stock market might disrupt. In 1996 and 1997, the government 
clamped down on the market forcefully by resorting to the People’s Daily 
editorial, again because of the danger that an enormous bubble would cause 
to the economy and society.490 The bubble was triggered partly by the com-
petition between the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments to boost share 
trading and attract listings.491 This proved the danger of leaving the market 
under the control of local governments who were indifferent to regulation. 
It was no wonder that Beijing decided to centralize control and overhaul the 
regulatory system. 
It was only after the crisis, however, that investor protection really im-
proved. The crisis started with the exposure of a series of grotesque fraud. 
The media, not the government, were at the forefront of uncovering this 
fraud. Caijing, in particular, played a crucial role and took the lead in inves-
tigating and reporting fraudulent companies.492 These revelations ignited a 
public outcry and widespread condemnations. As share prices plunged and 
the market declined, investors became even angrier. Investors used the new-
ly emerged Internet to exchange views, share their sentiment of frustration, 
and voice anger. By this time, the government was under huge pressure to 
take action to crack down on fraud. In the early 2000s, the number of stock 
investors had increased to tens of millions.493 These investors shared the 
common experience of suffering tangible losses as a result of securities 
fraud. They could easily identify with each other. This meant that stock in-
vestors were a natural political constituency in China, even though they 
were and are still not allowed to formally organize themselves.494 As their 
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number grew to the tens of millions, this political constituency became very 
powerful. So powerful that even the Chinese government, with no electoral 
pressure, had to take heed and respond to their complaints. Moreover, as the 
number of investors grew, the demand for financial and stock market infor-
mation increased. In response, financial media and news reports proliferat-
ed, helping inform investors and enabling them to express views with 
stronger collective voices.495 It can be seen that market growth created a 
constituency of stock investors whose political power increased as the mar-
ket grew, which led to better investor protection. 
The government was motivated by another consideration to tackle 
fraud and enhance investor protection. Falling share prices revealed yet 
more scandals, driving share prices down further. Investors began to lose 
confidence and withdraw from the market. Listing had to be slowed down 
and then suspended.496 The plan to use the stock market to reform SOEs was 
then derailed. Although the stock market was a liability to the economy in the 
eyes of Beijing in the early 1990s, it became an important asset by the early 
2000s after it had grown to a substantial scale. It was not only an important 
source of finance for SOEs, but was also seen to offer a solution to their 
governance problems. Listing was established as the guiding policy for 
SOE reform, and such a reform strategy seemed to be feasible after the 
stock market had grown to a significant size.497 The government finally 
found a way to transform and revitalize the state sector, calling the share-
holding system “the primary form of organization for the state economy” 
and encouraging SOEs to be listed.498 With the decline of the market, how-
ever, the reform of SOEs by listing had to be halted. To revive the market so 
that SOE reform could continue, fraud had to be curtailed and investor pro-
tection had to be guaranteed. After the stock market had grown to a substan-
tial size, it was not just important for SOE reform but seen as strategic to 
the whole economy. It was said that the stock market could improve the ef-
ficiency of the national economy by allowing the market to play a role in 
capital allocation, support innovation, and develop the private sector, which 
was critical to job creation and economic development, and enhance the 
safety of the financial system by allowing more equity finance to balance 
bank lending.499 These were the motivations behind the government’s deci-
sion to open the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Board in 2004 and the 
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ChiNext in 2009 at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.500 To achieve these stra-
tegic goals, however, fraud had to be checked and investor protection had to 
be guaranteed in order to ensure that the market could revive and continue 
to grow. 
China’s experience thus demonstrates that, although investor protec-
tion is critical to sustaining market growth, the improvement of investor 
protection is caused by market growth. Growth brought about stronger po-
litical demand for investor protection. Growth also amplified the signifi-
cance of the market to economic reform and the national economy, motivat-
ing the government to crack down on fraud in order to restore investor con-
fidence and revive the market. Therefore, the experience of China suggests 
that market growth and investor protection are in a bidirectional rather than 
unidirectional causal relation. The trajectory of development is growth first, 
followed by the strengthening of law, which has allowed the market to grow 
further. 
Nevertheless, the virtuous cycle of “growth-law-further growth” is not 
a guarantee, and market growth may not always lead to stronger investor 
protection, as evidenced by the fact that serious corruption, waste, overin-
vestment, and mismanagement are still rampant among listed SOEs. Why 
are investors in China still vulnerable to these managerial misbehaviors? 
Why has market growth led to the reduction of market fraud but not mana-
gerial misconduct? One explanation is the continuing dominance of state 
ownership in listed SOEs. Because of this dominance, the CPC and gov-
ernments still enjoy a monopoly in staffing the senior managerial positions 
of listed SOEs. The serious agency problems inherent with traditional SOEs 
persist and managers’ incentives to steal and shirk remain. 501  Minority 
shareholders, who invest real money in listed companies, are powerless, 
despite CSRC’s corporate governance initiatives and increased legal rights. 
The Company Law of 2005’s introduction of cumulative voting and minori-
ty shareholders’ right to propose resolutions to shareholders’ meetings are 
useless because of the overwhelming state ownership; independent directors 
are in fact not independent when the controlling shareholders are so power-
ful they can decide the selection, appointment, and remuneration of inde-
pendent directors; performance-based remuneration is not workable when 
the stock market is volatile, companies enjoy monopoly, or the chances of 
managers being caught stealing are slim; the absence of hostile takeovers—
the natural consequence of ownership dominance—and the monopolies en-
joyed by many listed SOEs in product markets means market discipline is 
an illusion, or simply does not work, particularly when staffing is based on 
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political considerations, personal connections, or bribes; and enhanced dis-
closure, although perhaps a “pesticide” for controlling shareholders’ misap-
propriation, is ineffective in exposing and deterring managers from stealing 
and shirking.502 The dominance of state ownership provides an explanation 
for why market growth has not led to the reduction of managerial misbehav-
ior, and why additional CSRC corporate governance initiatives and in-
creased shareholder rights are ineffective. As long as listed companies are 
state-controlled and the CPC and governments maintain their power to ap-
point senior managers, it is doubtful their governance can significantly im-
prove. Apparently, the dominance of state ownership in listed companies is 
due to the remaining socialist ideology that favors public over private own-
ership, which is still enshrined in the constitution of both the CPC and the 
country, and the CPC’s political consideration to maintain its rule over the 
country.503 Hence, the fundamental obstacle to the improvement of investor 
protection from market growth is ideology and politics. 
Second, the reduction of market fraud is currently achieved through 
public enforcement of securities laws by the CSRC and the two exchanges 
under its control, but its remit to oversee the management of listed compa-
nies is limited.504 It has no authority to take legal actions and punish SOE 
managers for corruption, waste, and mismanagement. In the meantime, pri-
vate enforcement of laws is negligible and courts are useless for investor 
protection. Although the Company Law of 2005 introduced the derivative 
action, shareholders face various hurdles in bringing a derivative lawsuit 
and so far no action in connection with a listed company has ever been tak-
en.505 For private securities litigation, investors were incapacitated in using 
such a lawsuit to protect themselves after the Supreme People’s Court im-
posed various restrictions and the class action was prohibited.506 The gov-
ernment is just not serious about empowering investors to call corporate 
managers to task by way of litigation for fear of losing control. Another rea-
son for the impotence of the court is its weak position in the political struc-
ture of the state507—courts are under the leadership of CPC and subordinate 
to the People’s Congresses. Such an arrangement serves to ensure that the 
CPC’s power is unchallenged. As a result, courts are in a difficult position 
when adjudicating cases involving SOEs because SOEs are the economic 
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foundation of the CPC and a part of the state apparatus. Hence, politics 
again explains why market growth fails to reduce managerial misbehaviors 
at listed companies. Last, when corruption is endemic in the whole country, 
it is unrealistic to expect SOE managers to be any more honest. To ensure 
that the whole country is less corrupt, fundamental political changes have to 
be made. 
To conclude, the experience of China demonstrates that, although in-
vestor protection is necessary to sustain market growth, the improvement of 
investor protection is a result of market growth. Market growth, however, 
does not automatically result in better investor protection, and politics and 
ideologies are the fundamental hurdle. 
China’s experience thus reveals that the strength of investor protection 
in a country is not predetermined by its legal origin. Law is not static and 
investor protection can improve in response to political demands brought 
about by market growth. This happened in China, a country without the tra-
dition of rule of law. It is true that market growth may not always lead to 
better investor protection, but the fundamental obstacles in China are poli-
tics and ideology rather than its legal origin. China’s experience shows that 
no country is destined to be hopeless just because of its history. 
B. Market Growth in the First Place 
If the improvement of investor protection is caused by market growth, 
it is necessary to ask the fundamental question: why does a market grow in 
the first place? First of all, the stock market in China grew because of eco-
nomic reform and development. After funding from government budgets 
was cut off in the mid-1980s as a result of reform, SOEs were forced to 
seek alternative financing.508 A demand for financing via the stock market 
was created. As the reform scheme expanded, demand increased. Later the 
stock market was not just a source of SOE financing, but also became a venue 
for reforming the governance of SOEs, adding more economic rationale for 
developing the market. 509  Moreover, economic liberalization spurred the 
phenomenal growth of the private sector, generating a new demand for fi-
nance. By the early 2000s, meeting the financing demand of private enter-
prises became an urgent issue, hence the opening of the Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprise Board in 2004 and the ChiNext in 2009.510 By the end of 
2011, more than half of the number of listed companies were private enter-
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prises.511 As of 2014, there were more than 600 companies queuing for an 
IPO and listing.512 China’s stock market still has huge potential to grow on 
the demand side. On the other hand, as the economy grew rapidly, so did 
household disposable income and savings,513 providing sufficient supply to 
meet demand. There is no doubt that, because China has maintained a 
steady growth of household savings since the start of economic reform in 
1978, China’s stock market has been able to grow rapidly. Chinese house-
holds had RMB 50 trillion in bank savings at the end of 2014.514 Hence, on 
the supply side, the growth potential of China’s stock market could be met. 
The question becomes whether households will actually invest their money 
in the market. 
Second, the market could emerge and grow also because of ideologi-
cal, political, and economic liberalization. Such liberalization not only 
brought about economic growth, which underscored the growth of the stock 
market, but also directly allowed the market to develop. The government 
permitted the shareholding system to emerge and develop in the 1980s be-
cause the ultra-leftist ideology that regarded capital as being exploitative 
and evil was gradually abandoned, and the command economic system that 
banned private ownership of the means of production was relaxed. 515 
Speeches by Deng Xiaoping during his “Southern Tour” in 1992 further 
broke down the leftist dogmas that market and capital were incompatible 
with socialism.516 The political stigma attached to the shareholding system 
and the stock market was then removed and the ideological and political 
obstacles for stock market development cleared. In 1997, the CCP further 
liberalized its ideology and policy towards the shareholding system and 
stock market,517 and the government has since actively encouraged the de-
velopment of the stock market. It is clear that without this liberalization, the 
shareholding system would not have emerged, and the stock exchanges 
would not have been allowed to open and grow. Lastly, though household 
income and savings increased rapidly, the opportunities for investment were 
limited until the mid-2000s. Chinese people did not have much choice but 
to invest in the stock market or leave their money in banks with low interest 
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earnings.518 As a result, the lack of alternative investment opportunities also 
contributed to the rapid growth of the stock market before the mid-2000s. 
Although the bear market and sluggish growth between 2010 and 2014 
was explained by the low profitability of listed companies, the low profita-
bility was caused by other factors besides weak investor protection. First, 
the dominance over the market of inefficient SOEs reduced profitability. 
Second, it is notable that private listed companies, though more efficient, 
fare no better in profitability. One study found that between 2002 and 2006, 
the ROE of private companies was lower than that of listed SOEs. In fact, in 
2005 ROE was -1.4% as compared to 8.39% for SOEs.519 By 2011, the 
WAROE for private companies was 12.12%, still lower than SOEs at 
14.51%.520 One reason was that SOEs had a much higher level of debt lev-
erage.521 Another was that private and state companies operate in different 
sectors with different levels of profitability. As of the end of 2006, 62.47% 
of private listed companies were from the manufacturing sector with tight 
profit margins, while SOEs dominated the lucrative sectors such as finance, 
communications, utilities, infrastructure, and natural resource exploita-
tion.522 Indeed, only two listed banks are privately controlled, and all the 
telecommunication network operators and most of the oil, gas, coal, and 
metal production companies are state-controlled.523 In those sectors where 
entry barriers do not exist, private companies are much more profitable than 
state companies.524 Because private companies are barred from those lucra-
tive sectors, their profitability is low and the profitability of listed compa-
nies as a whole suffers. 
Third, the unaccommodating business environment also caused low 
profitability. Business in China faces endless and inhibiting bureaucracy 
and predatory financial burdens. A 2013 survey found that, on average, eve-
ry business sought 17.67 government approvals, received 19.06 government 
inspections and assessments, and their senior managers attended 24.5 gov-
ernment meetings. In addition, they paid nearly 10% of their revenues in tax 
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and their social security contributions amounted to 40% of employees’ total 
salary.525 The World Bank’s Doing Business 2016 finds that China ranked 
84th overall among all 189 economies under assessment. Specifically, in 
China it takes 30 days to start a business and 274 days to secure a construc-
tion permit, all while tax and other mandatory contributions account for 
67.2% of a business’ total profits, placing China in the 136th, 176th, and 
132nd ranks for these categories, respectively.526 All these reduce the effi-
ciency of business and eat into their profits. 
Fourth, low profitability is also due to the fact that industrial and low-
end service companies comprise the majority of listed companies in Chi-
na.527 The profitability of these companies is much lower than their coun-
terparts in developed economies because they lack technologies, brand 
names, managerial expertise, innovation, and so on. The case of Apple and 
its Chinese supplier, Foxconn, whose profit margins were respectively over 
30% and 1.5%, is a stark example.528 
Fifth, from the mid-2000s, the booming real estate market provided 
Chinese people a highly profitable investment opportunity.529 In addition, 
the emergence of shadow banking in the late 2000s offered investors even 
more options than stock investment.530 
Last, the profitability of listed companies is linked to macro economic 
performance. GDP and profitability simultaneously surged in 2007 and re-
covered in 2009 and 2010. After 2010, as GDP growth decelerated, corpo-
rate profitability declined.531 
The growth potential of China’s stock market was constrained by the 
dominance of SOEs over the stock market and lucrative business sectors, 
the excessive bureaucracy and cost of doing business in China, and listed 
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companies’ limited technological, managerial, and innovation capacity. 
Again, the dominance of SOEs is due to the ideology and politics that favor 
state ownership. In addition, the excessive bureaucracy and costs of doing 
business could be a result of a political system with unchecked government 
powers. Also, the limited capacity of listed companies can be partly ex-
plained by the fact that China is still a developing economy. All in all, Chi-
na’s experience indicates that stock market development is ultimately de-
termined by ideologies, politics, and economic development. This not only 
explains why market growth does not lead to stronger law, but also why a 
market does or does not grow in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Having grown to one of the largest in the world in just over two dec-
ades, China’s stock market deserves more attention in law and finance re-
search. A thorough investigation of the development history of the market 
reveals that, instead of being a counterexample to the importance of law for 
financial market development, the case of China demonstrates that law is 
critical to sustaining market growth. Nevertheless, the trajectory of devel-
opment in China is growth first followed by law. China’s experience thus 
suggests that law and market growth have a bidirectional rather than unidi-
rectional causal relation, and the course of development is growth first fol-
lowed by law and then further growth. But the virtuous cycle of “growth-
law-further growth” is not a guarantee, as evidenced by the fact that, though 
now better protected from market abuse, Chinese investors remain vulnera-
ble to serious managerial misconduct at listed SOEs. Political and ideologi-
cal constraints are the root obstacle. Politics and ideologies, in addition to 
economic growth, are fundamental to stock market development because 
they not only explain the stagnation of law in China despite market growth, 
but also market growth or lack thereof in the first place. Lastly, China’s ex-
perience reveals that the strength of law is not predetermined by the legal 
origin of a country and that no country is destined to be hopeless just be-
cause of its history. Law improves in certain respects even in China, a coun-
try without the tradition of rule of law. 
What lessons can be learned from the history of China’s stock market 
development? For China itself, further political and ideological liberaliza-
tion is the key to fulfilling the growth potential of the market. They are es-
sential to strengthening investor protection and improving corporate profit-
ability and investment return of the market. For countries that want to de-
velop their stock markets, although Chinese lessons may not be directly 
applicable, the experience of China could nevertheless provide an analytical 
framework to guide policy development. Some critical questions should be 
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answered. First, are the first-order conditions present? Is there enough de-
mand for and supply of finance? Are the politics and ideologies favorable or 
hostile to equity financing and the stock market? Second, is the profitability 
of listed companies adequate? If not, what are the causes of low profitabil-
ity? Third, is investor protection strong enough? What are the fundamental 
obstacles that obstruct the improvement of investor protection? 
